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a b s t r a c t
We examine how mehr, a conditional payment from husbands to wives in the event of divorce, and dowry, a transfer from the bride’s family to the groom at the time of marriage,
have ﬂuctuated in Bangladesh due to natural shocks. We develop a model of the marriage
market in which dowry acts as a groom price, whereas mehr serves to deter ineﬃcient
divorces. Our comparative statics results show that mehr and dowry are both increasing
(decreasing) in shocks that raise (lower) income. We then exploit several natural experiments in Bangladesh including the Green Revolution in the 1960s, war of independence in
1971, and famine of 1974 to explain ﬂuctuations in the value of mehr and dowry observed
in Muslim marriages. Using two household survey datasets, we ﬁnd partial support for our
theoretical predictions. To rule out alternative explanations, particularly the effect of legal
changes, we use household survey data from the Indian state of West Bengal that experienced a similar increase in agricultural productivity but none of the legal changes affecting
Bangladesh. These results demonstrate that natural shocks may affect social institutions.
© 2020 Published by Elsevier B.V.

1. Introduction
In this study, we examine how mehr and dowry, two well-established social institutions in Bangladesh, have ﬂuctuated
through natural shocks. According to Islamic law, Muslim marriage contracts require specifying a mehr, a monetary payment
from the husband to the wife (Bianquis et al. (1996); Carroll (1986a)). In Bangladesh as well as other countries in the
Indian subcontinent, a mehr is a deferred payment paid only in the event of a divorce (Amin et al. (1997); Kamal (2001);
Huda (2006); Ambrus et al. (2010)).1 A dowry, on the contrary, is a payment from the wife to the husband during marriage,
which is common among both Muslims and non-Muslims, not only in Bangladesh and the Indian subcontinent, but also in
most South Asian countries.2

∗

Corresponding author.
E-mail address: shyamal.chowdhury@sydney.edu.au (S. Chowdhury).
1
While Islamic law prescribes that a mehr be paid on the consummation of marriage, the practice is different in Bangladesh and the Indian subcontinent.
2
The institution of the dowry goes back to the Greek city stages (800 to 30 0 0 BCE) and Romans (around 200 BCE). While the dowry was then eclipsed
by the Germanic system of a bride price, it was reinstalled by the Middle Ages. Further, it continued to be widespread during the Renaissance and early
modern Europe, and is still widespread in South Asia (Anderson and Bidner (2015); Anderson (2007) (Tables 2 and 4)).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103510
0014-2921/© 2020 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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Despite being forbidden by law in India since 1961, in Pakistan since 1976, and in Bangladesh since 1980, paying a dowry
persists in all three settings (see Rao, 1993 for India, Anderson 2003 for Pakistan, and Esteve-Volart 2004 for Bangladesh).
Further, over the past few decades, there has been an increase in the incidence of dowry payments as well as substantial
dowry inﬂation in these countries (Rao (1993); Amin et al. (1997); Anderson (20 03); Esteve-Volart (20 04)).3 Although no
systematic data on dowry-related violence and death exist, it is estimated that more than 200 women are killed every year
in Bangladesh due to dowry-related violence.4 Sekhri and Storeygard (2014) report that in India, on average, 12 women die
in every district each year due to dowry-related violence and the trend, if anything, is increasing over time (there were
640 districts in India in 2011). Similarly, mehr, which is enshrined in Islamic law, continues to ﬂourish in Muslim societies
(Amin et al. (1997)).
A stylized fact about mehr and dowry in Bangladesh is that both have experienced large ﬂuctuations since the 1960s (see
Section 5). Further, Bangladesh has experienced three major economic (and political) shocks since the 1960s (described in
greater detail in Section 2): (i) the introduction of new agricultural technologies in the 1960s, popularly known as the Green
Revolution (GR), (ii) war of independence of 1971 (IW), and (iii) famine of 1974. The adoption of new technology during
the GR period acted as a positive income shock. In particular, given the nature of the technological change, the GR had a
positive effect on labor income. By contrast, the IW and famine both acted as negative income shocks.
Our central thesis is that there is a causal link between these income shocks and changes in dowry and mehr. In tracing
a link between the economic aspects of marriages and marriage market institutions, we follow Becker (1973, 1981) and
Cherchye et al. (2017), who argue that gains from marriages play a critical role in understanding marriage markets, with
such gains depending on particular unions, as well as the marriage market as a whole. While Cherchye et al. (2017) demonstrate that outside options play a critical role in deciding the share of household resources obtained by a spouse,
Cherchye et al. (2016) show their effect on divorce probabilities as well. Our study contributes to this literature by bringing
both dowry and mehr, two important marriage market institutions, into the picture.
We ﬁrst develop a model of marriage markets that respects institutional realities; in particular, we consider societies
in which norms and institutions favor men. One aspect of this bias is that in the event a marriage is not successful (as
formalized later), the decision to divorce, if any, is taken by men.5 Consequently, men may opt to divorce their wives even
though the aggregate surplus of the couple would be higher if they stayed married rather than obtained a divorce. This
possibility of ineﬃcient divorce creates a role for mehr, as it is a cost that men have to incur in the event of a divorce,
thus discouraging such divorces. Given that the divorce decision is taken by men, the optimal mehr thus equals the utility
of men from divorce net of their utility from continuing in a marriage that is “average” (i.e., neither a success nor a failure,
as formalized later). Dowry plays the role of a groom price, ensuring that the marriage market clears. In the equilibrium,
dowry therefore equals the utility of men from remaining unmarried net of their ex ante utility from marriage. Along the
equilibrium path, divorce happens if and only if it is eﬃcient; moreover, mehr payments are made when the marriage is a
failure.
Turning to the effect of various income shocks, we demonstrate that a positive income shock (e.g., the GR) leads to an
increase in mehr. With social norms being biased in favor of men, divorce imposes a low cost on them (as formalized later).
Hence, an increase in the income of men increases their utility from divorce to a greater extent than that from an average
marriage, making divorce relatively more attractive. Hence, the level of mehr must increase to prevent ineﬃcient divorces
in such marriages. Similarly, the famine and IW, both interpreted as negative income shocks, make divorce less attractive.
Therefore, these lead to a decline in mehr.
The effect of an income shock on dowry is similar to than on mehr; although the former is of a smaller magnitude, the
rate of change in both dowry and mehr is the same. The result is intuitive. Dowry equals the utility of men from remaining
unmarried net of the opportunity cost of doing so, whereas mehr equals the utility from divorce in a failed marriage net of
the corresponding opportunity cost. The opportunity cost of remaining single is the expected utility from entering into a
marriage, which may or may not fail. By contrast, the opportunity cost of divorce in a failed marriage is the utility from
such a marriage. The result now follows given that the utility from a failed marriage which is the opportunity cost of getting
a divorce is low.
We next consider several extensions of the baseline framework as robustness checks. Allowing for the fact that in patriarchal societies men may have property rights over the income of their wives (see Anderson and Bidner (2015)), we
show that income shocks are positively correlated with mehr as long as their effects on men and women are similar and
cause the same rate of change in mehr and dowry. We also extend the analysis to allow for income heterogeneity among
men and women. We show that an equilibrium with positive assortative matching exists in which all the comparative statics predictions go through. Among other extensions, we consider a setup in which dowry is set via bargaining between
the families of the groom and bride. Under certain additional conditions, the comparative statics results also go through
qualitatively.

3
Anderson and Bidner (2015) state that in Bangladesh “the total cash and goods involved are often so large that the transfer can involve impoverishment
of the bridal family.” Similar points were made by Rao (1993) and Huda (2006), among others.
4
See http://khabarsouthasia.com/en_GB/articles/apwi/articles/features/2012/02/15/feature-02.
5
According to the Shari’a, a husband may unilaterally divorce his wife (Brandt and Kaplan, 1995–1996), a belief that persists widely among Muslims and
is practiced in India (Vatuk (2008)) as well as Bangladesh and Pakistan (Carroll (1986b)).
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To take the model predictions to the data, we exploit the natural experiments of the GR, IW, and famine. We use two
distinct household datasets collected in 20 04–20 05 and 2010–2011 in Bangladesh. For identiﬁcation purposes, we rely on
pre-post comparisons to argue that income shocks have a causal effect on ﬂuctuations in mehr and dowry. We ﬁnd that the
value of (log) mehr increased signiﬁcantly during the GR period, whereas it decreased in the IW/famine period compared
with the respective previous periods. However, the changes in the values of dowry are not signiﬁcant, although they do
follow a pattern similar to that of mehr.
To check the robustness of our results, we analyze a third dataset from the Indian state of West Bengal, which is similar
to Bangladesh in many respects and experienced an increase in agricultural productivity (which we call the GR) at the same
time. Bangladesh and West Bengal are contiguous, sharing a common cultural and linguistic history. In British India, (united)
Bengal was partitioned into East Bengal (now Bangladesh) and West Bengal, with East Bengal becoming a part of Pakistan
and West Bengal becoming a part of India when the British left in 1947. We ﬁnd that patterns of ﬂuctuations in the values
of dowry and mehr in the GR period are similar in Bangladesh and West Bengal. Over 1960–20 0 0, several legal changes
in Bangladesh aimed to restrict polygamy and curb the practice of dowry. Two of these legal changes, namely the Muslim
Family Law Ordinance of 1961 (MFLO) and Registration of Muslim Marriages and Divorces Act of 1974 (MMDA), coincided
with the advent of the GR and the occurrence of the famine, respectively. By contrast, there were no such legal changes in
West Bengal, which was then part of India. Therefore, the fact that mehr and dowry showed similar patterns in Bangladesh
and West Bengal are attributed to economic shocks rather than legal changes. This conclusion ﬁnds further support from
the existing literature.6 Finally, we do not ﬁnd any support of the possibility that the increased mehr in the 1960s was a
result of “missing women” caused by female infanticide and neglect of female children (Sen (1990)).
Finally, we interpret dowry as essentially a groom price rather than a bequest. While there is some evidence to suggest that pre-mortem bequest to daughters (i.e., joutuk) was a component of dowry in Bangladesh until the early 1970s,
Arunachalam and Logan (2006) argue that, relative to groom price dowries, bequest dowries have decreased in prevalence
and amount over time.7 This is the position taken, among others, by Anderson and Bidner (2015). Another important driver
seems to be whether women have a right to property, with bequest being more prevalent in societies where they do. We
brieﬂy discuss the implications of modeling dowry as a bequest in a remark in Section 4.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study that shows the effects of natural shocks on levels of mehr and dowry.
In addition, our study is distinctive in the marriage market literature in several respects. The extant literature on marriage
market transactions has mostly focused on dowry in assuming a competitive marriage market in which the dowry acts as
a market-clearing groom price (Cole et al. (2001); Peters and Siow (2002); Anderson and Bidner (2015)).8 While we also
assume a competitive marriage market, our study differs signiﬁcantly from this strand of the literature by considering a
framework with both dowry and mehr. We show that mehr can play an important role in ensuring the eﬃciency of the
marriage market. It is somewhat surprising that despite its universal practice in Muslim marriages, the institution of mehr
has not received adequate attention in the literature.
One study that analyzes a competitive marriage market framework with both dowry and mehr is Ambrus et al. (2010).
The authors argue that while the increase in both mehr and dowry in the 1960s can be traced to the MFLO, their declines in the 1970s can be traced to the MMDA. There are important differences between the two studies, however. First,
while Ambrus et al. (2010) examine legal changes, they abstract from economic and political ones. By contrast, we consider
both aspects and ﬁnd support for the economic and political channels, using the events in West Bengal as a counterfactual to rule out the effect of legal shocks. Second, while Ambrus et al. (20 0 0) argue that the MFLO increased mehr and
dowry, our model predicts a decline in both mehr and dowry. Finally, we demonstrate that the empirical results reported in
Ambrus et al. (2010) are sensitive to their empirical methodology.9
Another related study is Anderson and Bidner (2015), who model two marriage market institutions, namely dowry and
parental investment in children (i.e. bequests). Among other interesting results, they demonstrate that women’s rights over
dowry tend to deteriorate with development. They also generate predictions for when marital transfers will disappear.
Their formulation, however, does not allow for divorce. Moreover, while our extended model incorporates some elements of
Anderson and Bidner (2015), namely men’s property rights over spousal income, our results are not driven by these.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the economic and political shocks that Bangladesh
has experienced since the 1960s. In Section 3, we present our theoretical framework, deriving some testable hypotheses.
In Section 4, we extend the model in several dimensions. Next, in Section 5, we discuss the datasets and some of the key
descriptive statistics. The identiﬁcation and estimation strategies are explained in Section 6. In Section 7, we present our
main empirical ﬁndings, and in Section 8, we rule out alternative explanations such as legal changes. Finally, we conclude
in Section 9.

6
Esteve-Volart (2004) uses a rural household survey conducted in a sub-district of Bangladesh (Matlab Health and Socio-Economic Survey) and ﬁnds no
effect of the MMDA on the amount of dowry in Muslim marriages in the post-1974 period (Table 5).
7
The datasets used for the empirical analysis prevent us from separating bequest dowry from total dowry. Although information about three types of
dowry (cash and kind such as jewelry, land and animals, and their ownership) was collected, only the monetary value of total dowry was ascertained.
Since marriages involve multiple types of dowries and their complex ownerships, the value of bequest dowry cannot be separated.
8
Some earlier studies including Becker (1981); Rao (1993) also assume that the dowry is the groom price.
9
See Section 8.1 and Appendix B for a more detailed discussion of the results in Ambrus et al. (2010)
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2. Natural shocks during the 1960s and 1970s
2.1. Income shocks
Since the 1960s, Bangladesh has experienced several exogenous economic (and political) shocks, with the GR being one
of the most signiﬁcant. Beginning in 1959, the then-East Pakistan government adopted several new technologies as well as
policies favoring the agricultural sector. Under the Grow More Food program in 1959, the government introduced chemical
fertilizers (Hossain et al. (1994)) and mechanized irrigation at heavily subsidized rates (Falcon et al. (1970)). These inputs
became readily and widely available in the early 1960s; over 1961–1970, the disbursement of chemical fertilizers increased
by 35.5% per annum (Khan (1972), Table 5.8, p. 50). Other technological innovations included the introduction of pesticides,
improved local seed varieties, and a shift to the Japanese method of rice cultivation, which involved a series of laborintensive operations (Falcon et al. (1970), pp. 270, 288–298).
The adoption of these new technologies led to a substantial increase in agricultural productivity. During 1961–1970, both
East and West Pakistan experienced unprecedented growth in agriculture and rural private investment. The annual agricultural growth rate nearly tripled, increasing from 1.2% to 3.2%. In Bangladesh (then East Pakistan), the agricultural sector grew
at 3% per annum on average over this period. Rice, which contributed 70% of the value added of all crops, grew at 3.4% per
annum and Boro rice, which was a prime consumer of modern inputs, grew at 6.2% per annum (Falcon et al. (1970), Table
9.12, p. 293, Table 9.13, p. 295). These technologies increased demand for labor and consequently wages.10
We consider 1961 to be the commencement of the GR, as this is the earliest documented increase in agricultural income,
although our results, presented in Section 7, are robust to the choice of an alternative commencement date. In particular,
the analysis goes through qualitatively if we take the starting point to be 1967,11 the year in which high-yielding variety
seeds were introduced (David and Otsuka (1994)).
A second major event was the IW, which broke out abruptly in March 1971 and ended in December 1971 with the former
East Pakistan separating from Pakistan and emerging as a new nation, Bangladesh. The war was extremely costly on several
dimensions, most importantly in terms of the two to three million civilian lives lost (Riedel (2011)). Further, approximately
10 million people were forced to take refuge in neighboring India, with most completing their resettlement in Bangladesh
only by the end of 1973. In addition, the war devastated the economy; GDP declined by 5.6% in 1971 and by 15% in 1972.
The IW was clearly a large negative income shock.
Soon after the war and resettlement of refugees, the country was hit by another major negative shock, this time a
devastating famine in 1974 that disproportionately affected the rural population. Following this famine, GDP declined by
more than 4% in 1975 (per capita GDP declined by about 6%). Taken together, the IW and famine were not only major
negative income shocks, the effects persisted for some time, with GDP only returning to its pre-war level in 1977 (per
capita GDP returned to pre-war levels only in 1989 because of the higher population growth rate. Fig. A.1 in Appendix
A shows GDP, per capita GDP, and their growth).
Based on the income shocks discussed above, we deﬁne four distinct periods over which ﬂuctuations in dowry and
mehr follow different patterns: i) the pre-GR period (pre-1961), ii) the GR (1961–1970), iii) the IW/famine, and iv) the
post-famine period. However, the duration of the impact of the IW/famine is diﬃcult to ascertain in the absence of further
shocks. Although the famine occurred in 1974, its negative effects were likely to have persisted in subsequent years. We thus
choose the 1975 cut-off (i.e., the 1971–1975 interval) as the end of the IW/famine period since the last large GDP decline
occurred in 1975.12
2.2. Legal shocks
Between 1961 and 2004, Bangladesh made the following ﬁve amendments to Muslim family laws governing marriage,
dowry, and divorce as well as case law developments pertaining to these: (i) the MFLO, (ii) the MMDA, (iii) the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1980 and Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Ordinances of 1982, 1984, and 1986, (iv) Case Law Development
in 1990 (Rustom Ali v. Jamila Khatun) and a Supreme Court verdict in 1998, and (v) the Women and Children Repression
Prevention Act of 20 0 0. The ﬁrst legal change (i.e., the MFLO in 1961) coincided with the GR and the second legal change
(i.e., the MMDA in 1974) coincided with the famine.
The main objective of the MFLO, which became effective in Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) in 1963,13 was to restrict
polygamy and arbitrary divorces. In a bid to reduce polygamy, it imposed the requirement that to allow a second marriage,
the husband has to obtain the consent of his ﬁrst wife as well as the written permission of the local government authorities
at the residence of his second wife. In addition, the new marriage had to be “just and necessary” given the current wife’s
condition and ﬁnancial status of the husband. The MFLO empowered Union Councils to not only arbitrate on these matters,
10
The GR had a large positive effect on wages, especially for men. Using village-level daily wage data from India, D’Agostino (2017) ﬁnds that the GR
generated a 7% wage increase for male laborers in the 1960s and 1970s. Women substituted away from wage work and increased their unpaid own-farm
work and home production.
11
The results are available upon request.
12
We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this point.
13
See http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_fections_all.php?id=305, accessed February 29, 2012.
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but also impose jail sentences on men violating these conditions. As to the second objective (i.e., discouraging arbitrary
divorces), while the MFLO mandated that the husband inform local council oﬃcials of any talaq14 pronouncements, this was
never formally implemented in that there were no penalties for failure to comply or any explicit speciﬁcation of maintenance payments. Thus, as far as implementation was concerned, the MFLO essentially acted to discourage polygamy, with
little effect on divorce.
The main objective of the MMDA was to further restrict polygamy and arbitrary divorces by making marriage registrars widely available.15 It established a system of physical registries for divorce registration and mandated that divorce can
only be granted in courts. Taken together, these restrictions increased expected divorce costs for men since they raised the
chances that men would have to pay maintenance and possibly mehr in the event of a divorce. Further, men who gave a
verbal talaq without going before the courts could be penalized.
The main objective of the Dowry Prohibition Act and subsequent amendments in the 1980s was to reduce dowry by
making both the giving and the receiving of dowry illegal.16 Anti-dowry provisions were further strengthened by the Women
and Children Repression Prevention Act of 20 0 0, which, among other things, speciﬁed the penalties to be meted out in
case of dowry-related violence and death. The two case law developments of 1990 and 1998 went against the Maliki17
interpretations of alimony obligations speciﬁed in the MFLO. In 1990, in Rustom Ali v. Jamila Khatun, 43 DLR (1991) 301, the
High Court ruled that a former wife may not claim alimony unless the parties have a previously established agreement. In
1998, the Supreme Court upheld the 1990 ruling on alimony, thereby strengthening the importance of mehr.

3. The framework
We consider an economy that comprises two types of families, one having a potential groom each and the other having
a potential bride each. The mass of families with a potential groom is 1, whereas the mass of families with a potential bride
is N, where N ≤ 1.18 For simplicity we assume that all agents are risk neutral.19 Moreover, all men are identical, as are all
women, with all men having the same income m and all women having the same income w.20 We assume, as is realistic,
that w < m, although the analysis does not depend on this assumption in any way. The two income measures m and w
encapsulate several important elements in the context of marriages, including not only the economic potential of men and
women, but also their personal characteristics such as age, beauty, and educational qualiﬁcations. In the event of a marriage,
a woman (man) brings her income w (his income m) to the marriage.
We assume marriages are monogamous.21 Once a marriage takes place, it turns out to be one of three kinds, successful,
failed, and average, with the probabilities γ s , γ f , and γ a respectively, where 0 < γ s , γ f , γ a < 1 and γs + γ f + γa = 1. A
successful marriage has a positive effect on the aggregate surplus of the couple, denoted S[w + m], in that S > 1.22 On the
contrary, the surplus is t f [w + m] if the marriage fails and ta [w + m] if the marriage is average, where tf < ta ≤ 1.23 In these
societies, marriage is the social norm, and thus men and women who either get divorced or decide not to participate in the
marriage market at all do worse than those in a successful marriage.24 Under either eventuality, a man has a utility of μm m
and a woman has a utility of μw w, where S > μm , μw .
We assume that social norms are biased in favor of men; hence, men take the divorce decision.25 Moreover, either being
divorced or remaining single is costlier for women (i.e., μm > μw ).26 In what follows, we maintain the following parametric

14
Talaq is an Arabic/Islamic word for divorce. In the classical Islamic law, which is often followed in the Indian sub-continent, a Muslim man has the
unilateral right to dissolve the marriage by simply pronouncing it (Awad and Mawla (2013)).
15
See http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_fections_all.php?id=476, accessed on February 29, 2012.
16
http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/sections_detail.php?id=607&sections_id=10780&vol=22, accessed on February 29, 2012.
17
Maliki is one of four prominent schools of religious law within Sunni Islam, the dominant interpretation among Muslims in Bangladesh.
18
The assumption that there are more men than women is realistic for many developing countries, including those countries that we study. In our data
for Bangladesh, 99% of women get married between 10 and 25 years and 95% of men get married between 15 and 35 years. The total number of men (in
the age bracket of 15 and 35) divided by the total number of women (in the age bracket of 10 and 25) has remained higher than 1 since 1951 (varying
between 1.08 and 1.24).
19
Assuming risk neutrality simpliﬁes the exposition by abstracting from issues of insurance. It is straightforward to argue that the analysis goes through
as long as agents are not too risk averse. The details are available upon request.
20
In reality, there is heterogeneity among men and women, given that m and w capture not only income, but also age, education, and so on. In Remark 7,
we allow for income heterogeneity among men and women, arguing that this would lead to positive assortative matching. We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this point.
21
According to the 2011 Long Census data, the prevalence of polygamy among Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and Christians in Bangladesh is 5.85%, 2.39%,
1.25%, and 1.02%, respectively.
22
Browning et al. (2014) argue that such gains can be traced to sharing public goods, or the division of labor within a marriage, among other things.
23
We later extend the framework in various directions, ﬁnding that this does not affect the results qualitatively. Further, in Section 4, we allow for a
scenario in which men have property rights over their spouse’s income.
24
Borker et al., 2017 assume that the social norm in India is that all women must marry.
25
For example, see Brandt and Kaplan (1995–1996), who discuss husbands’ rights to divorce their wives among Muslims in Bangladesh, Egypt, and
Tunisia.
26
Divorced women in Bangladesh and other South Asian countries are socially stigmatized and not accorded a status equal to that of married women
(Dreze and Sen (1995); Esteve-Volart (2004)).
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condition (that also incorporates some of the preceding considerations):

S > μm > ta > max{t f , μw },

(1)

which is a necessary condition for both mehr and dowry to be positive in the equilibrium, as we later argue.27
We next turn to the eﬃciency implications of divorce, namely how it affects the sum of the husband and wife’s utility.
Getting divorced is ineﬃcient if a marriage is average, whereas it is eﬃcient if it is a failure; formally,

t f [w + m] < wμw + mμm < ta [w + m].

(2)

Given that men take the divorce decision, however, in certain situations men may, in their own interest, decide to divorce
their spouses even though doing so is ineﬃcient. We argue that this possibility of ineﬃcient divorces creates a role for
mehr.
Marriage contracts can involve two types of transfers, dowry (denoted by D), which is an upfront payment from a
woman’s family to the groom, and mehr (denoted by M), which is a conditional payment made by a man’s family to the
bride in the event of a divorce.28 , 29 Given a marriage contract (D, M), we can now specify the utility functions of men and
women. The utility of a man equals

uM =

⎧
Sm + D, if the marriage is successful and there is no divorce,
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
t
⎪
⎨ f m + D, if the marriage has failed but there is no divorce,
ta m + D, if the marriage is average but there is no divorce,

⎪
⎪
⎪
μm m + D − M, if there is divorce,
⎪
⎪
⎩
μm m, if the man remains single.

(3)

Similarly, the utility of a woman is given by

uW =

⎧
Sw − D, if the marriage is successful and there is no divorce,
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨t f w − D, if the marriage has failed and there is no divorce,
ta w − D, if the marriage is average but there is no divorce,

⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪μw w − D + M, if there is divorce,
⎩
μw w, if the woman remains single.

(4)

We next deﬁne the notion of the equilibrium for this society; we are only concerned with the utilities of the brides
and grooms themselves. In reality, other considerations (e.g., the potential gain in status for the concerned families), can be
expected to enter these negotiations. Anderson and Bidner (2015), for example, consider the utility of the parents as well.
Borker et al. (2017), on the contrary, assume that the wealth of families is an important consideration. We, however, abstract
from such considerations.
We follow Rosen (1974), Peters and Siow (2002), and Anderson and Bidner (2015), among others, by modeling the marriage market equilibrium competitively.30 The equilibrium “price,” denoted by (D∗ , M∗ ), comprises both dowry and mehr. A
woman’s strategy is optimal with respect to (D∗ , M∗ ) if she participates in the marriage market if and only if doing so yields
higher utility than not participating. Similarly, a man’s strategy is optimal with respect to (D∗ , M∗ ) if (i) he participates in
the marriage market if and only if doing so yields higher utility than not participating and (ii) he opts to divorce his wife if
and only if doing so yields him higher utility.
Let PM (D∗ , M∗ ) denote the number of men participating in the marriage market and PW (D∗ , M∗ ) denote the number of
women, with the strategies of all agents being optimal given (D∗ , M∗ ).
We can now formally deﬁne the notion of an equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1. A marriage market pricing rule (D∗ , M∗ ) is an equilibrium if and only if the numbers of participating men and
women are equal, namely PM (D∗ , M∗ ) = PW (D∗ , M∗ ).
We are interested in equilibria that satisfy some additional properties, particularly that of eﬃciency.
27
The new element in (1) is that μm > ta > μw . It is straightforward to see that if, instead μm , μw > ta , then the second inequality in (2) does not hold.
Hence, even in the case of an average marriage, divorce is eﬃcient and there is no scope for mehr in our framework. By contrast, if, instead, ta > μw , μm ,
then given that S > μm , (10) does not hold and dowry cannot be positive.
28
The theoretical framework is consistent with the institutional realities in both Bangladesh and West Bengal (India). In our data, most women get
married. Moreover, most marriages involve both mehr and dowry. According to all three datasets, both in Bangladesh and in West Bengal, all Muslim
marriages involved mehr and all marriages in Bangladesh and most marriages in West Bengal involved dowry. The numbers are available from the authors
upon request.
29
Brown (2009) demonstrates that dowry plays a role in ensuring the upkeep of brides, essentially by increasing their bargaining power. This is an aspect
from which we abstract.
30
In Section 4, we brieﬂy consider a framework in which dowry is determined by bargaining between the bride’s and groom’s families, arguing that,
subject to some additional parametric restrictions, the results are qualitatively similar.
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Deﬁnition 2. An equilibrium (D∗ , M∗ ) is eﬃcient if and only if (a) the outcome involves no ineﬃcient divorce and (b) for
any man and woman, the aggregate ex ante surplus from marriage (followed by divorce if that is eﬃcient) exceeds that
from remaining single.
Turning to condition (a), it is straightforward to check that while divorce is ineﬃcient in successful and average marriages, it is eﬃcient in a failed marriage.31 Turning to condition (b), the aggregate ex ante surplus from marriage (followed
by divorce if the marriage fails), namely γs S[m + w] + γ f [mμm + wμw ] + γa ta [m + w], exceeds that from remaining single,
namely μm m + μw w.32 Thus, eﬃciency demands that all women get married.
We focus on equilibria that are not only eﬃcient, but also under which the mehr M∗ is at the minimum possible level
consistent with eﬃciency. As we later show, doing so ensures partial consumption smoothing for men in that their utility
from average and failed marriages is the same. Given the reality that social norms favor men, it is therefore natural to focus
on this level of mehr.33 For ease of exposition, we henceforth refer to eﬃcient equilibria satisfying this minimum condition
for mehr simply as equilibria.
Turning to the analysis of the equilibrium, in a successful marriage, the man’s payoff from a stable marriage exceeds that
in the case of a divorce:

Sm + D > μm m + D − M.

(5)

Hence, divorce never takes place. However, depending on (D, M), divorce may happen if the marriage is average or it
fails. In particular, divorce happens if and only if ti m + D < μm m − M + D, ti ∈ {tf , ta } (i.e., if the mehr is small):

M < m [ μm − t i ] .

(6)

Eq. (6) shows that divorce decisions are not affected by the level of dowry. Thus, it must be mehr which ensures that no
ineﬃcient divorce can arise.34
We next solve for the equilibrium level of mehr, setting it so as to ensure that divorce is eﬃcient. Recall that in the
absence of mehr, divorce happens both when the marriage is average and when it is a failure, whereas divorce is eﬃcient if
and only if the marriage fails. From (6), the minimum level of mehr that prevents divorce in an average marriage is

M ∗ = m [ μm − t a ] .

(7)

Observe that for a mehr of
divorce happens if the marriage fails (since t f m + D < μm m
+ D, given that ta > tf ),
whereas divorce never happens in a successful marriage. Thus a mehr of M∗ is the minimum mehr that ensures that divorce
happens if it is eﬃcient, i.e. if the marriage is a failure. Further, note that a man’s utility in case of a failed marriage is
mμm − M∗ + D∗ , which, from (7), equals his utility in case of an average marriage, i.e. ta m + D∗ . Thus the equilibrium mehr
M∗ ensures that the utility of a man is the same irrespective of whether the marriage is average or a failure, so that there
is partial consumption smoothing for men.
Proposition 1 summarizes the preceding discussion.
M∗ ,

− M∗

Proposition 1. The equilibrium mehr M∗ ensures that divorce happens if and only if doing so is eﬃcient (i.e., the marriage is a
failure). There is no divorce otherwise. Moreover, mehr payments happen in the equilibrium, particularly in the case of a failed
marriage.
We next turn to solving for the equilibrium dowry, ﬁnding that it is determined by the willingness of men to get married
(among other things). To be precise we deﬁne D∗ as the level of dowry such that men are indifferent between remaining
single and getting married, and then argue that this D∗ is indeed the equilibrium dowry. The utility of a man from remaining
single is μm m. Next consider a man’s utility from getting married (allowing for the fact that there would be divorce in case
of a failed marriage). Using the fact that a man obtains Sm + D∗ in case the marriage is successful, ta m + D∗ if it is average,
and μm m − M∗ + D∗ = ta m + D∗ in case it fails, a man’s utility from getting married is

γs Sm + γ f (μm m − M∗ ) + γata m + D∗ = γs Sm + γ f ta m + γata m + D∗ .
Consequently,

D∗

must satisfy μm m = γs Sm + γ f ta m + γa ta m

+ D∗ ,

so that

D = m[μm − γs S − (1 − γs )ta ].
∗

D∗

(8)

(9)

is positive whenever men are not too badly off in the event of remaining single; formally,

μm > γs S + (1 − γs )ta .

(10)

31
Divorce is ineﬃcient in successful and average marriages since the surplus from marriage exceeds the surplus from divorce, namely S[m + w] > ta [m +
w] > μm m + μw w (see (2)). On the contrary, it is eﬃcient in a failed marriage since t f [m + w] < μm m + μw w (see (2)).
32
The result follows since S[m + w] > ta [m + w] > μm m + μw w, where the second inequality follows from (2).
33
For the consumption smoothing argument to bite, one has to allow for risk aversion. In Remark 8 later we examine risk averse agents, ﬁnding that
mehr ensures partial consumption smoothing for men.
34
Consider a marriage that has either failed or is average. Given the preceding discussion (see (6), it is clear that in the absence of mehr, the outcome
will involve divorce (since μm > ti , i = a, f ). Moreover, given (2), a divorce in case of a failed marriage will be eﬃcient.
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Since the dowry is positive and increasing for these societies over the relevant period (as discussed in the Introduction), we
assume that (10) holds in what follows.
It is straightforward to see that (D∗ , M∗ ) constitutes an equilibrium. In Proposition 2, we argue that all women participate
in the marriage market. Thus, all women enter and PW (D∗ , M∗ ) = N. By contrast, given (D∗ , M∗ ), men are indifferent between
staying single and entering the marriage market. Therefore, (D∗ , M∗ ), where (i) M∗ is set to satisfy Proposition 1, (ii) D∗
satisﬁes (9), (iii) all women and N of the men participate in the market, and (iv) men take the divorce decision optimally,
constitutes an equilibrium.
Proposition 2. There exists an equilibrium (D∗ , M∗ ), where all women participate, M∗ is set at the minimum level that prevents
ineﬃcient divorce and the dowry D∗ ensures that men are indifferent between entering the marriage market and remaining single.
For N < 1, (D∗ , M∗ ) is the unique equilibrium.
Proof. We prove this result in two steps.
Step 1. All women participate: It is suﬃcient to argue that all women prefer to get married rather than remain single. From Proposition 1, the equilibrium level of mehr ensures that divorce happens if and only if the marriage fails.
Consequently, women’s utility from participation equals γs Sw + γ f [wμw + M∗ ] + γa ta w − D∗ = γs Sw + γ f [wμw + m(μm −
ta )] + γa ta w − m[μm − γs S − (1 − γs )ta ]. This exceeds women’s utility from remaining single, namely wμw , if and only if
γs S(w + m ) + γ f (wμw + mμm ) + γa ta (w + m ) > mμm + wμw ; that is, if and only if the ex ante surplus from marriage (allowing for eﬃcient divorce if the marriage is a failure) exceeds the surplus from remaining single. This is true given (1) and
(2).
Step 2. Unique equilibrium: Let N < 1. Clearly, in any (eﬃcient) equilibrium, the amount of mehr must equal M∗ . If the
dowry exceeds D∗ , then all men participate, while at most N women do, so that the marriage market cannot clear given
that N < 1. Whereas if the dowry is less than D∗ , then no man participates, while all women do. 
Example. To establish that the various assumptions are mutually consistent, consider the example in which S = 2, ta =
0.6, t f = 0.4, μm = 1, μw = 0, γs = 0.25 and w = m > 0. These parameter values satisfy the constraints (1), (2), and (10).
Moreover, mehr and dowry are positive, and women prefer to participate in the marriage market rather than remain single.
3.1. Exogenous shocks: Income and legal
We next develop some testable hypotheses that we can take to the data. To this end, we examine the impact of income
shocks on the equilibrium values of both mehr and dowry. We also examine the impact of legal changes, as some of these
coincided with the income shocks.
3.1.1. Income shocks
As discussed in Section 2, the GR in Bangladesh in the 1960s can be interpreted as a positive income shock, whereas the
IW of 1971 and 1974 famine can be interpreted as negative income shocks. From (7), it is straightforward to show that the
level of mehr is increasing in m.
Proposition 3. Consider the effect of income shocks. The equilibrium mehr M∗ increases if the shock is a positive one and decreases otherwise.
Proposition 3 is intuitive. Recall that the role of mehr is to prevent ineﬃcient divorces in the case of an average marriage.
Given that the divorce decision is taken by men, mehr equals the utility of men from getting a divorce net of their utility
from continuing in an average marriage. While a positive income shock, particularly an increase in m, raises the utility of
a man both in the event of his getting a divorce as well as continuing in an average marriage, there is a greater increase
in utility in the former than in the latter event. Thus, under a positive income shock, the incentive to divorce increases,
necessitating an increase in mehr as well.
Turning to the effect of income shocks on dowry, it is straightforward to check that

dD∗
dM∗
= μm − γs S − (1 − γS )ta < μm − ta =
.
dm
dm

(11)

Since the opportunity cost of remaining single (i.e., a man’s ex ante utility from getting married) exceeds the opportunity
cost of a divorce in an average marriage (i.e., a man’s utility from continuing in such a marriage), the result follows intuitively.
Finally, income shocks generate the same rate of change in mehr and dowry as shown by

dlogD∗
1
d log M∗
=
=
.
dm
m
dm

(12)

Proposition 4. Both the level of dowry and the level of mehr increase at the same rate under a positive income shock.
Propositions 3 and 4 together suggest the following testable hypotheses: both dowry and mehr increase during the GR
in Bangladesh and India, whereas they decrease during the IW and famine in Bangladesh.
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3.1.2. Legal shocks
During the study period, there were several changes in Muslim law, particularly the MFLO and MMDA. Importantly, the
MFLO occurred around the same period as the GR and the MMDA occurred around the same time as the famine. Given these
legal changes, we then examine whether the observed changes in mehr and dowry during this period could be attributed
to these legal changes instead.
As discussed in Section 2.2, the MFLO aimed to restrict polygamy (while restrictions were imposed on arbitrary divorces
as well, these were ineffective). In our framework, this can be expected to increase the utility from the ﬁrst marriage, so
that S, tf , and ta should all increase. Thus, from (7) and (9), both mehr and dowry decrease.
The MMDA, on the contrary, aimed to reduce arbitrary divorces (as discussed in Section 2.2), which can be formalized
as a reduction in μm , since a decline in μm makes divorce less attractive. Another objective was to reduce polygamy, which
can be expected to increase S, tf , and ta . From (7) and (9), it is straightforward that both mehr and dowry decrease.
Further, similar to the case of income shocks (Proposition 4), we examine whether legal shocks have a smaller absolute
effect on dowry than on mehr. We consider a benchmark case in which both the MMDA and the MFLO affect S, ta , and tf to
the same extent, so that dS = dta = dt f . It is then straightforward to see that

and,

dD∗
dM∗
= −m =
,
dta
dta

(13)

dD∗
dM∗
=m=
,
d μm
d μm

(14)

so that the MFLO and MMDA have the same effect on both dowry and mehr.
Proposition 5. Consider the impact of the MFLO and MMDA.
(i) Following the implementation of the MFLO, formalized as an increase in S, ta , and tf , both mehr and dowry decrease.
(ii) Following the implementation of the MMDA, formalized as a decrease in μm as well as an increase in S, ta , and tf , both
mehr and dowry decrease.
(iii) Following either the MFLO or the MMDA, dowry and mehr change by the same magnitude.
Thus, our framework predicts that, ceteris paribus, both the MFLO and the MMDA affect dowry and mehr in a similar
fashion. In particular, the immediate effect of the MFLO would be to reduce the level of mehr and dowry, which is contrary to the empirical reality in Bangladesh. The predictions from the MMDA are, however, consistent with the changes in
mehr and dowry during this period. Consequently, we argue that changes in mehr and dowry cannot be attributed to legal
changes.
To check the robustness of our results, we examine several extensions. In Remark 6, we examine the situation in which
women are refunded a part of their dowry in the case of divorce. In Remark 7, we allow for income heterogeneity among
men and women.35 While in Remark 8 we examine the case where the agents are risk averse.
Remark 6. We next relax the assumption that in the case of a divorce the husband keeps the entire dowry. In line with
reality, suppose that in the case of a divorce women were refunded the proportion α of the dowry, where 0 < α < 1.
This is often true, for example, of any dowry given in the form of jewelry. We can mimic the analysis in the main text to
demonstrate that the equilibrium mehr is



M∗∗ = m (1 − α )[μm − ta ] + αγs [S − ta ]



and equilibrium dowry is

D∗∗ = m[μm − γs S − (1 − γs )ta ],
meaning that both are increasing in m. It is then straightforward to see that Proposition 5 goes through whenever S and ta
increase by the same extent because of the MFLO or MMDA (i.e., dS = dta ).
Remark 7. We next allow for heterogeneity in the income levels of men and women using the simplest possible framework
that captures some of the trade-offs. Assume that there are two men, with income m1 and m2 , where m1 > m2 > 0, and
two women with income w1 and w2 , where w1 > w2 > 0. Let M(i, j) (D(i, j)) denote the level of mehr (dowry) in a marriage
between a man with income mi and a woman with income wj .
An equilibrium consists of a marriage market assignment36 and the marriage market contracts (M(i, j), D(i, j)), i, j = 1, 2,
such that given these contracts, (a) all agents who are married obtain higher utility than if they do not enter the marriage
market, (b) men take divorce decisions optimally, and (c) there exists no man mi and woman wj , such that mi and wj are
not matched under the assignment; moreover, they strictly prefer to marry each other rather than follow the assignment.
35

We are indebted to the anonymous reviewers for suggesting both these extensions.
An example of such an assignment could be one in which there is positive assortative matching, with m1 (m2 ) getting married to w1 (w2 ); that is a high
(low) income man marries a high (low) income woman.
36
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It is then straightforward to argue that an equilibrium involves positive assortative matching and marriage market contracts such that (see Chowdhury et al. (2019))

M (i, i ) = M (i, j ) = mi (μm − ta ), i, j = 1, 2,

(15)

D(i, i ) = D(i, j ) = mi [μm − ta − γ (S − ta )], i, j = 1, 2.

(16)

From (15) and (16), it is clear that all our comparative statics predictions in Propositions 3 and 4 go through. Further,
this equilibrium generates the prediction that both the mehr and the dowry levels of high income couples exceed that of
low income couples.37
Remark 8. Let the utility function of men be um (.), and that of women be uw (.), where both um (.) and uw (.) are concave. It is
straightforward to check that the equilibrium mehr remains unchanged at M∗ = m(μm − ta ). Thus, the utility of a man from
an average marriage is um (ta m + D∗ ) which equals his utility from a failed marriage um (mμm − M∗ + D∗ ) = um (ta m + D∗ ).
Thus there is partial consumption smoothing in these two states of the world for men. Further, the equilibrium dowry D∗
solves

um (μm m ) = γ u(Sm + D∗ ) + (1 − γs )u(ta m + D∗ ).

(17)
xα

Let the utility functions of men satisfy CRRA, so that um (x ) = α , where 0 < α < 1. One can then show that
Chowdhury et al. (2019) for the details). Thus both mehr and dowry are increasing in m. Moreover,

dD∗
dM∗
| α → 1 = μm − t a − γ ( S − t a ) < μm − t a =
.
dm
dm

dD∗
dm

> 0 (see

(18)

Thus whenever the agents are not too risk-averse, i.e. α is not too small, Propositions 3 and 4 go through.
Among other extensions, we allow for marriage shocks that vary continuously. We ﬁnd that our comparative statics
predictions go through under all these extensions.38 Chowdhury et al. (2019) also analyze an alternative two-stage game in
which a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists that coincides with that described above. Thus, in this game, eﬃciency
follows as a result rather than being an assumption.
4. Extensions and discussion: Property rights over women’s income
The baseline framework has been kept parsimonious to focus on the essential trade-offs. We now extend the analysis to
allow for the fact that men typically have property rights over the income generated by their wives in patriarchal societies.39
Formally, following a marriage, a man obtains the proportion λ of his wife’s income, where 0 < λ < 1; here, λ denotes men’s
property rights over their wives’ income (see Anderson and Bidner (2015)). Thus, the post-marriage effective income of a
man is given by X[m + λw], while that of a woman is given by X (1 − λ )w, where X ∈ {S, tf , ta } depending on the nature of
the marriage.
To focus on economies in which dowry is positive, remaining single must be attractive for men, formally

mμm > m[γs S + (1 − γs )ta ] + λw[γs S + (1 − γs )ta ],

(19)

where (19) is the analogue of (10) in the preceding section. Moreover, (19) also ensures that

mμm > mta + λwta ,

(20)

so that a man prefers to divorce his wife rather than continue in an average marriage, ensuring that mehr is also positive.
One can mimic the earlier analysis to show that whenever a marriage is either successful or average, divorce is ineﬃcient.
Further, the aggregate ex ante surplus from marriage exceeds that from remaining single. Divorce never takes place if the
marriage is a successful one, whereas in state ti , divorce happens if and only if M < m[μm − ti ] − λwti . Recalling that mehr
is set at the minimum level that prevents ineﬃcient divorce if the marriage is average,

M∗ = m[μm − ta ] − λwta .

(21)

M∗ ,

Hence, given
men are indifferent between divorcing their spouses and continuing in average marriages. The mehr
M∗ is positive given (20). Moreover, it is lower than that in the baseline model because in this framework staying married
is more attractive to men since they obtain a share of their spousal income.
Next, the equilibrium dowry D∗ is such that men are indifferent between remaining single and getting married, so that

D∗ = m[μm − γs S − (1 − γs )ta ] − λw[γs S + (1 − γs )ta ].

(22)

37
We conjecture that if one allows for complementarity between income levels (e.g., if the aggregate surplus in the case of a marriage between mi and
wj is given by X (mi + w j + mi w j ), X ∈ {S, tf , ta }), then there is a unique equilibrium assignment with positive assortative matching.
38
We refer readers to Chowdhury et al. (2019).
39
Men’s rights over women’s earnings in patriarchal societies such as Bangladesh is well recognized. Even in cases in which women borrow from MFIs
such as the Grameen Bank that exclusively focuses on women, men often decide the loan’s utilization as well as take the proﬁt (Rahman (2008)).
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We now examine the impact of various income and legal shocks on both mehr and dowry. From (21) and (22), it is
straightforward to see that

dM∗ = [μm − ta ]dm − ta λdw,

(23)

and, dD∗ = [μm − γs S − (1 − γs )ta ]dm − λ[γs S + (1 − γs )ta ]dw.

(24)

Turning to the absolute effect of an income shock on mehr and dowry, while M∗ is positively related to m, it is negatively
related to w.
Given that the labor market for women is an imputed one, it is however diﬃcult to empirically establish whether the
changes in m are larger or smaller than those in w. We therefore focus on the benchmark case in which any income shock
generates identical proportional changes in m and w, so that dw/w = dm/m. From (23) and (24),

d M ∗ = m ( μm − t a )

dD∗ = m



dm
dw
dw
− wta λ
= M∗
,
m
w
w

μm − γs S − (1 − γs )ta

 dm
m

− λw

(25)


 dw
dw
γs S + (1 − γs )ta
= D∗
.
w

w

(26)

Thus, both mehr and dowry increase with a positive income shock and decrease under a negative one whenever the
proportionate changes in the income of men and women are similar.
We next compare the effect of income shocks on mehr relative to that on dowry. Following any income shock, the
absolute value of the change in mehr exceeds that in dowry. Moreover, income shocks generate the same rate of change in
mehr and dowry; formally,

dlogM∗
1
dlogD∗
=
=
.
dm
m
dm

(27)

Proposition 9. Consider the effect of income shocks on mehr and dowry. Let the income shock lead to identical proportional
changes in the income of men and women (i.e., dw/w = dm/m). Following a positive (negative) income shock, the equilibrium
mehr and dowry increase (decrease) at the same rate.
We then consider the effects of the MFLO and MMDA. Mimicking the preceding analysis, we can show that
Proposition 5 goes through, suggesting that the MMDA and MFLO have qualitatively similar impacts in this case.
Finally, while the GR was staggered over the 1960s, the IW and famine happened over a three-year period in the 1970s.
Given this longer temporal spread and the fact that women beneﬁted during the GR, we expect the GR to raise the property
rights of women in the long run (i.e., reduce λ). Given (21) and (22), a fall in λ can be expected to increase both mehr
and dowry in the long run. These long-term effects may counteract some of the negative income shocks during the IW and
famine episodes.
Finally, we brieﬂy discuss some of the other modeling decisions made in this study:
1. Motivated by the institutional realities in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, we assume that mehr is a conditional payment
made only in the event of a divorce. Mehr is usually divided into two parts: a prompt mehr payable immediately on
marriage and a deferred mehr paid in the case of a divorce (Rapoport (20 0 0); Welchman (20 0 0)). In Bangladesh, while
the formal marriage contract (kabin) can involve both forms of mehr, typically most mehr is deferred rather than prompt
(Kamal (2001); Huda (2006)). This is also veriﬁed by Ambrus et al. (2010), who ﬁnd that none of the marriages in their
sample had a prompt mehr exceeding $1.
2. While we follow the literature in assuming that dowry acts as a groom price that clears the marriage market, it may
be of interest to examine what happens if dowry also involves some negotiations between the two concerned families.
Allowing for such inter-family bargaining may capture some elements of reality in these societies. Consider an alternative
framework in which mehr is still set to prevent ineﬃcient divorce, whereas dowry is settled through asymmetric Nash
bargaining between the families. We ﬁnd that a close connection between the dowry levels in this formulation and
our baseline model. Moreover, under some additional conditions, the comparative statics results are qualitatively similar
under both formulations and would thus yield similar testable hypotheses.40
3. For completeness, we brieﬂy discuss the implications for our theoretical framework if dowry is indeed a bequest rather
than a groom price. The theoretical prediction from this literature (Zhang and Chan (1999); Edlund (20 0 0); Botticini and
Siow (2003); Brown (2009)) is that dowry does not depend on the productivity of the groom and is decreasing in the
income of the bride. Thus, in a framework under which mehr still serves to prevent ineﬃcient divorce, whereas dowry
is a pre-mortem bequest, a positive income shock has a positive effect on mehr, but no effect on dowry.

40

The details are available in Chowdhury et al. (2019).
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Fig. 1. Mean real value of mehr and dowry by year of marriage (based on the PKSF data).

5. Data and descriptive statistics
To test our model predictions, we used three household survey datasets; two of these were conducted in Bangladesh
and the third one in the Indian state of West Bengal that borders Bangladesh. All three surveys used identical modules on
marriage, divorce, mehr, and dowry. The ﬁrst survey was administered to 1820 households in 91 villages across all major
geographical regions of Bangladesh between December 2010 and January 2011.41 After employing the data-cleaning steps
described below, the sample contained 1981 marriages in 1,457 households.
The second dataset was collected between December 2004 and January 2005 for the Bangladesh Rural Urban Linkage
Survey (BRULS) by the International Food Policy Research Institute. It was a follow-up study to the Household Income and
Expenditure Survey of 20 0 0 conducted by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics in which 1360 rural households drawn from
68 villages (mouzas) in 16 districts of the Rajshahi Division were surveyed (BBS 2005). In 2004, the BRULS resurveyed 1271
households from the existing sample (6.5% attrition) as well as added 200 new households from 10 new villages in the
same division; hence, the new sample had 1471 households drawn from 78 villages. After employing the same cleaning
steps described below, the sample had 1367 marriages in 865 households.
The third dataset was collected from 20 0 0 households drawn from 100 villages distributed over six districts in West
Bengal. All these districts (Cooch Behar, Malda, Murshidabad, Nadia, North Dinajpur, and South Dinajpur) are adjacent to
Bangladesh (Appendix A Figs. A.2 and A.3), and all of them with the exception of one border Bangladesh. The survey was
commissioned by the Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi and was conducted by the National Field Service of India between
December 2014 and January 2015.
To create our working sample, we adopt the following cleaning procedure. First, only Muslim households are included;
second, only ﬁrst marriages are included; third, only relationships involving household heads, spouses, or sons/daughters
are included; and ﬁnally, missing values of dowry and mehr are deleted. In both datasets from Bangladesh, the real values
of dowry and mehr are calculated using the price deﬂator reported in the online Appendix in Ambrus et al. (2010). For the
West Bengal data, the consumer price indices published by the Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation, India are
used to calculate the real values of dowry and mehr.
Fig. 1 shows the trends in the logarithmic values of dowry and mehr observed in the PKSF data, where we plot the real
mean values by year for these variables. For ease of exposition, the three natural shocks discussed in Section 2, namely the
GR, IW, and famine, are marked along the horizontal axis. Both dowry and mehr payments ﬂuctuated considerably from
the 1950s to the 1970s and then both stabilized in the subsequent period. We attribute these large ﬂuctuations in earlier
periods to the small number of observations because of survivorship bias.42 However, some patterns can be observed from
the graph. Mehr increased in the GR period and then decreased in the IW-famine period; however, dowry decreased in both
periods. Aside from ﬂuctuations, the value of dowry was larger than that of mehr in the pre-GR period, while the trend
reversed after the 1980s.

41
These households were drawn from an earlier survey commissioned by the Palli Karma Shahayak Foundation (PKSF) and conducted by the Bangladesh
Institute of Development Studies in 1997–1998.
42
In our case, survivorship bias refers to the fact that only a small proportion of individuals who married in earlier periods were alive during the survey.
In the BRULS, the percentages of observations in the pre-GR, GR, IW/famine, and post-famine periods are 0.59%, 3.29%, 3.51%, and 92.61%, respectively. By
contrast, the respective numbers in the PKSF data are 4.04%, 9.19%, 6.92%, and 79.86%. One explanation is that the rural northwestern region in Bangladesh,
where the BRULS was conducted, has historically been the poorest region in the country, with the highest incidence of poverty and shortest life expectancy.
Therefore, the number of surviving individuals who married in earlier periods is smaller in the BRULS dataset. By contrast, the PKSF data cover all of
Bangladesh, thereby reducing survivorship bias in the sample. In the West Bengal data, the percentages of observations in the pre-GR, GR, IW/famine, and
post-famine periods are 1.53%, 4.43%, 3.70%, and 90.34%, respectively.
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Table 1
Summary statistics (PKSF (2010) data).

Value of mehr
Value of dowry
Education, bride
Education, groom
Age at marriage, bride
Age at marriage, groom
Bride’s family richer
Groom’s family richer
N (All female)

All
Marriages over
the period
(1)

Regime I
Marriages
(before 1961)
(2)

Regime II
Marriages
(1961–1970)
(3)

Regime III
Marriages
(1971–1975)
(4)

Regime IV
Marriages
(1976–2010)
(5)

9.102
(0.055)
9.371
(0.032)
3.503
(0.085)
3.653
(0.090)
16.09
(0.068)
23.996
(0.108)
0.311
(0.010)
0.234
(0.010)
1981

8.334
(0.105)
9.939
(0.163)
0.775
(0.208)
1.625
(0.336)
13.475
(0.391)
23.887
(0.616)
0.212
(0.046)
0.313
(0.052)
80

8.984
(0.128)
9.791
(0.117)
1.412
(0.190)
2.181
(0.268)
14.434
(0.201)
24.335
(0.413)
0.28
(0.033)
0.231
(0.031)
182

8.476
(0.177)
9.705
(0.145)
1.745
(0.236)
2.409
(0.321)
15.029
(0.257)
24.153
(0.442)
0.35
(0.041)
0.161
(0.031)
137

9.209
(0.065)
9.265
(0.034)
4.034
(0.097)
4.032
(0.101)
16.504
(0.072)
23.949
(0.117)
0.317
(0.012)
0.237
(0.011)
1582

Figures in parentheses are standard errors.

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the real values of dowry and mehr to clarify the trends in Fig. 1 as well
as several bride/groom characteristics controlled for in the analysis. The logarithm of the real value of mehr (in taka) substantially increased from an average of 8.33 in the pre-GR period to 8.98 in the GR period (in absolute value, an increase
from 18,009 taka to 56,759 taka). Then, it declined to 8.48 in the IW/famine period. In the absence of any further shock, it
increased to 9.2 over the long horizon of the post-1975 (1976–2010) period. A similar trend is not observed in the case of
dowry, which decreased over time. In the BRULS data, both mehr and dowry increased in the GR period and then decreased
in the IW-famine period (Appendix A, Figs. A.4 and Table A.1). On the other hand, in the West Bengal data, both mehr and
dowry increased in both the GR and IW-famine periods (Appendix A, Figs. A.5 and Table A.2).43 In terms of bride and groom
attributes, the average years of schooling of brides increased over time. In the PKSF data, for example, it increased to 4.03
in the post-famine period from 0.78 in the pre-GR period. Age at marriage also increased for brides over the same period
(from 13.5 to 16.5 years), while that for grooms remained almost unchanged.
6. Estimation strategy
To test the impact of natural shocks on the values of dowry and mehr, we estimate the following two equations:
M
lnMiy = α M + γ r + β M μy + δ M XiyM + εiy
,

(28)

D
lnDiy = α D + γ r + β D μy + δ D XiyD + εiy
,

(29)

where lnMiy and lnDiy are the logarithms of the real value of mehr and dowry,44 respectively for woman i married in year
y, and μy is a vector of three dummy variables for the following four periods in both equations: (i) pre-GR (pre-1961), (ii)
GR (1961–1970), (iii) IW/famine (1971–1975), and (iv) post-famine (post-1975). γ r is the set of regional (district) dummies
to account for geographic variations in dowry and mehr. Both equations include marriage year (normalized to 1 in the ﬁrst
period of marriage in the data) and its square (to capture the non-linearity in the trend of the values of mehr and dowry).
Given the exogeneity of the shocks, our identiﬁcation relies entirely on pre-post comparisons. To understand the effect of
a particular shock, we compare the values of mehr and dowry after the shock with their respective values in the previous
period. Specially, we compare the GR values with the pre-GR values, the IW/famine values with the GR values, and the
post-famine values with the IW/famine values.45
In the marriage market literature since Becker (1973), it is widely recognized that brides and grooms have preferences for
certain attributes and that such preferences can lead to the emergence of marriage-related payments. Moreover, the nature
43
The values of dowry and mehr among Muslims are substantially lower in West Bengal than in Bangladesh after adjusting for the exchange rate. This
difference, although an interesting topic in its own right, is beyond the scope of the current investigation.
44
As the steps outlined to select the working sample retain only positive values of dowry and mehr, logarithmic transformation does not decrease the
sample size in our analysis. Given the large ﬂuctuations in dowry and mehr, such a transformation is also useful for accounting for heteroskedasticity.
45
Eqs. 28 and 29 are estimated independently. However, SURE estimations provide qualitatively similar results. See Ambrus et al. (2010), who also
estimate the mehr and dowry equations independently.
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and direction of such payments are often affected by socioeconomic factors such as the relative economic status of the two
families and income-earning potential of the groom and bride (Anderson (2003)). Other spousal attributes include income
(Botticini (1999)) and education (Deaolalikar et al. (1998); Dalmia and Lawrence (2005)). Empirical evidence pertaining to
both developed (Hitsch et al. (2010)) and developing countries (Rao (1993); Edlund (20 0 0)) usually supports the existence
of preferences for spousal attributes.
These bride and groom characteristics are uncorrelated with the natural shocks. Nonetheless, as robustness checks, we
control for a rich set of variables to account for these characteristics. The vectors XM and XD both contain a set of brides
and grooms’ attributes including the age and education differences between the bride and groom and their squares, two
dummies for the relative wealth of brides’ and grooms’ families46 at the time of marriage, and an indicator of whether the
groom chose the bride or the marriage was arranged by the families. When mehr is the dependent variable, the equation
includes the bride’s education and age (at the time of marriage) in the regression. Similarly, in the case of dowry, the
estimation equation includes the groom’s education and age (at the time of marriage) in the regression.47
Other changes over time might be spuriously correlated with the natural shocks. For example, regime shifts from the
bride price to dowry as well as any associated or subsequent dowry inﬂation are associated with a transition to more complex societies (see Hughes (1985) for Greece and Quale (1988) for Mesopotamia). However, such regime shifts are historical
processes occurring over a long period, perhaps several centuries. Gradual changes in both mehr and dowry for reasons not
related to natural shocks are reﬂected in their trend values, which are accounted for by including (non-linear) time trends.
The modernization of agricultural production including the introduction of heavy machinery changes demand for female
labor as well as causes greater wealth and income dispersion among men, leading to women competing for more aﬄuent
men (Quale (1988); Anderson (2003)). These changes in turn lead to changes in marriage market payments. Our ﬁrst natural
shock is the GR, which is indeed related to changes in the production process in the agricultural sector. However, agricultural production in Bangladesh involves only light machinery gradually introduced since the 1980s, during and after which
there is no considerable change in the values of dowry and mehr in our data.
We apply our empirical estimation strategy to the PKSF and BRULS data. The PKSF dataset is more representative than
the BRULS data given its sample area coverage and larger sample size. We also construct a combined dataset by merging
these two datasets. This merging is justiﬁed, as the information used in the analysis is the year of marriage as well as the
values of mehr and dowry paid or speciﬁed as part of the marriage, which are independent of the timing of the survey. The
same is true of the bride and groom’s attributes at the time of marriage.

7. Empirical results
Before presenting the results, it is worth reiterating the predictions of the model developed in Section 3.1.1 that the GR
(IW/famine) increases (decreases) the value of mehr and dowry similarly relative to their respective previous levels. We
compare the values of mehr and dowry in the GR period relative to the pre-GR period as well as in the IW/famine period
(1971–1975) relative to the GR period. The standard errors are clustered at the region and marriage-year levels because the
effects of shocks may not be uniform over time and across regions; for example, there may be regional variations in the
timing of the implementation of the GR and severity of the war and famine.
In the following, we ﬁrst present the results for the two datasets in Bangladesh and then check their robustness using
the data from West Bengal. The latter results are also used to counter the alternative explanation of ﬂuctuations in dowry
and mehr values such as legal changes in Bangladesh.

7.1. Results from the PKSF (2010) data
Table 2 presents the regression results for this dataset. The (log) values of mehr and dowry in each period are reported
relative to the previous period. Column 1 presents the results for mehr, without controlling for the attributes of brides and
grooms. The value of mehr increases signiﬁcantly during the GR relative to the previous period; the coeﬃcient is 0.97 (with
a t-value of 2.66), suggesting that value of mehr is 97% higher in the GR period relative to the previous period. It then
declines by 53% in the IW/famine period (1971–1975) compared with the GR level, although only signiﬁcant at the 11%
level (t-value is -1.61). Finally, the change in the post-famine period from the IW/famine period is not signiﬁcant.48 These
results support our model predictions that the value of mehr increases in the GR period and decreases in the IW/famine
period compared with the respective previous period before stabilizing in the post-famine period. These results are robust
to controlling for bride and groom attributes (column 3).

46
Relative wealth is categorized into three groups depending on whether the bride’s family is (i) economically richer, (ii) poorer, or (iii) equal relative to
the groom’s family.
47
Other attributes related to the appearance of the bride and groom such as skin tone and height (Billig (1992); Banerjee et al. (2013)) are not controlled
for in the regression as such data were not collected. Rao (1993) ﬁnds that dowry practices vary across caste groups; however, the caste system is absent
among Muslims.
48
The results are robust if the IW/famine period is deﬁned as 1971–1974. Please see the working paper version of this paper (Chowdhury et al. (2019)).
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Table 2
Impact of exogenous shocks on the real values of mehr and dowry (PKSF 2010 data).

GR coeﬃcient relative to pre-GR
IW-famine relative to GR
Post-famine relative to IW-famine
Observations
R-squared
Bride and groom characteristics
Interaction between region and year of marriage
p-value for χ 2 test for the equality of coeﬃcients
for dowry and mehr:
GR relative to pre-GR
IW-famine relative to GR
Post-famine relative to IW-famine

Log of
Mehr
(1)

Log of
Dowry
(2)

Log of
Mehr
(3)

Log of
Dowry
(4)

Log of
Mehr
(5)

Log of
Dowry
(6)

0.970∗ ∗ ∗
(0.365)
-0.534
(0.332)
-0.289
(0.354)
1,981
0.177
No
No

0.267
(0.291)
0.052
(0.206)
-0.400∗ ∗
(0.198)
1,981
0.200
No
No

0.851∗ ∗
(0.358)
-0.531
(0.323)
-0.173
(0.332)
1,981
0.209
Yes
No

0.184
(0.286)
0.027
(0.199)
-0.322∗
(0.186)
1,981
0.244
Yes
No

0.834∗ ∗
(0.363)
-0.514
(0.323)
-0.186
(0.337)
1,981
0.209
Yes
Yes

0.166
(0.282)
0.046
(0.197)
-0.346∗
(0.183)
1,981
0.247
Yes
Yes

0.120
0.065
0.709

0.151
0.079
0.609

0.150
0.080
0.606

Robust standard errors clustered at the region and marriage year level are in parentheses; ∗ ∗ ∗ p < .01, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ p < .1. All
regressions control for region ﬁxed effects, marriage year and marriage year squared, and a constant not reported in the table. Bride
and groom characteristics include their age and education, differences in their age and education, dummies for relative wealth of
the two families at the time of the marriage, and a dummy if the marriage was an arranged or chosen by the bride or groom.

Columns 2 and 4 (Table 2) present the results for the value of dowry. The estimated coeﬃcients for the GR compared
with pre-GR and for the IW/famine compared with the GR are not signiﬁcant.49 Combining the results for ﬂuctuations in
the values of mehr and dowry, we thus ﬁnd partial support for our model predictions.
To check if any events other than the shocks considered also inﬂuence ﬂuctuations in dowry and mehr, we include the
interaction of regions and years as an additional control. The results for mehr and dowry presented in columns 5 and 6,
respectively, remain strongly robust.
We test the equality of the coeﬃcients of logarithms of mehr and dowry and report the chi-square statistics for the null
hypothesis that they are equal.50 The comparison of the results (columns 1 vs. 2; columns 3 vs. 4; columns 5 vs 6) indicates
that the null is rejected (at the 10% level) only for the IW/famine period. It may seem surprising that the magnitudes of the
two coeﬃcients for the GR period differ by a wide margin even though the null of equality is not rejected. The reason may
be the small number of observations in this period (number of reported marriages in the earlier period) due to survivorship
bias. We therefore do not stress this point further.
One might question if our results are driven by the employment of women in the garment sectors in the 1990s and
female secondary school stipend programs in 1994. We re-estimate the equations restricting the sample period to 1989
(i.e., the post-famine period is deﬁned as 1976–1989). The results, including the effects of GR, remain qualitatively similar to
those reported in Table 2 (see Appendix A, Table A.3 for the PKSF data); in addition, the value of dowry does not signiﬁcantly
decline in the post-famine period relative to the IW-famine period, which is consistent with our model prediction.

7.2. Results from the BRULS (2004–2005) data
Column 1 in Table 3 presents the regression results for mehr when bride and groom attributes are excluded from the regression. The value of mehr increases during the GR compared with the pre-GR period and decreases in the IW-famine
period relative to the GR period, but the differences are not statistically signiﬁcant in either case. The value of dowry
follows a similar trend, but again, the coeﬃcients are not statistically signiﬁcant (column 2). The results remain qualitatively unchanged after controlling for bride and groom attributes, and the region-year interaction.
The insigniﬁcance of the results in this dataset may be due to the smaller sample size leading to larger survivorship bias;
moreover, the BRULS dataset comes only from the northern region of Bangladesh. To exploit the larger sample size, our ﬁnal
exercise in the next section involves merging the PKSF and BRULS datasets.

49
When the post-famine period is compared with the IW-famine period, the value of dowry signiﬁcantly decreases. However, this result is driven by the
long-term trend in dowry in the post-famine period. In our robustness check later in this section when the post-famine period is restricted to 1989, this
coeﬃcient becomes insigniﬁcant.
50
To test the equality of the coeﬃcients, we jointly estimate the mehr and dowry equations allowing the residuals of the two equations to be correlated.
The results are strongly robust; indeed, the standard errors of the estimated coeﬃcients slightly decrease.
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Table 3
Impact of exogenous shocks on the real values of mehr and dowry (BRULS 20 04–20 05 data).

GR coeﬃcient relative to pre-GR
IW-famine relative to GR
Post-famine relative to IW-famine
Observations
R-squared
Bride and groom characteristics
Interaction between region and year of marriage

Log of
Mehr
(1)

Log of
Dowry
(2)

Log of
Mehr
(3)

Log of
Dowry
(4)

Log of
Mehr
(5)

Log of
Dowry
(6)

2.103
(1.418)
-0.052
(0.428)
-0.011
(0.368)
1,367
0.116
No
No

1.284
(1.158)
-0.130
(0.365)
-0.399
(0.295)
1,367
0.079
No
No

1.728
(1.463)
-0.189
(0.422)
-0.047
(0.361)
1,364
0.193
Yes
No

0.641
(1.169)
-0.241
(0.354)
-0.413
(0.283)
1,364
0.225
Yes
No

1.756
(1.440)
-0.193
(0.423)
-0.044
(0.363)
1,364
0.193
Yes
Yes

0.668
(1.172)
-0.246
(0.355)
-0.411
(0.284)
1,364
0.225
Yes
Yes

p-value for χ 2 test for the equality of coeﬃcients
for dowry and mehr:
GR relative to pre-GR
IW-famine relative to GR
Post-famine relative to IW-famine

0.2714
0.828
0.184

0.1896
0.883
0.215

0.195
0.884
0.215

Robust standard errors clustered at the region and marriage year level are in parentheses; ∗ ∗ ∗ p < .01, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ p < .1. All
regressions control for region ﬁxed effects, marriage year and marriage year squared, and a constant not reported in the table. Bride
and groom characteristics include their age and education, differences in their age and education, dummies for relative wealth of
the two families at the time of the marriage, and a dummy if the marriage was an arranged or chosen by the bride or groom.

7.3. Results from the merged (PKSF and BRULS) data
Table 4 presents the regression results for the merged dataset. In all the regressions, we include a dummy for the two
datasets as well as control for the (non-linear) trend of the values of mehr and dowry in each dataset. Columns 1 and
3 show the results for mehr without and with the inclusion of the bride and groom attributes, respectively. Columns 5
additionally controls for the region-year interaction. Columns 2, 4 and 6 present the corresponding results for dowry. All
the results are qualitatively similar to those obtained using the PKSF data with the exception that the coeﬃcient on mehr
in the IW-famine period now becomes signiﬁcant.
To summarize, the results indicate that the value of mehr increases during the GR period and then declines during the
IW/famine. More speciﬁcally, the GR has a positive effect and the IW/famine has a negative effect on mehr. While the
corresponding changes in dowry are not signiﬁcant, they otherwise follow a trend similar to that of mehr with a change of
a smaller magnitude. Therefore, we ﬁnd partial support for our theoretical predictions summarized in Section 3.1.1.
Our ﬁnal robustness check involves addressing the survivorship bias (i.e., the lower number of observations in earlier periods). It is important to mention that in our context, the survivorship bias is not likely to cause sample selection
Table 4
Impact of exogenous shocks on the real values of mehr and dowry (PKSF and BRULS merged data).
Log of
Mehr
(1)

Log of
Dowry
(2)

Log of
Mehr
(3)

Log of
Dowry
(4)

Log of
Mehr
(5)

Log of
Dowry
(6)

Post-famine relative to IW-famine

1.157∗ ∗ ∗
(0.363)
-0.418
(0.275)
-0.233

0.394
(0.299)
0.013
(0.189)
-0.434∗ ∗

0.992∗ ∗ ∗
(0.354)
-0.457∗
(0.268)
-0.164

0.227
(0.288)
-0.029
(0.183)
-0.361∗ ∗

0.982∗ ∗ ∗
(0.358)
-0.447∗
(0.268)
-0.170

Observations
R-squared
Bride and groom characteristics
Interaction between region and year of marriage

(0.276)
3,348
0.233
No
No

(0.174)
3,348
0.158
No
No

(0.263)
3,345
0.267
Yes
No

(0.164)
3,345
0.229
Yes
No

(0.264)
3,345
0.267
Yes
Yes

0.213
(0.288)
-0.014
(0.182)
0.370∗ ∗
(0.163)
3,345
0.231
Yes
Yes

GR coeﬃcient relative to pre-GR
IW-famine relative to GR

p-value for χ 2 test for the equality of coeﬃcients
for dowry and mehr:
GR relative pre-GR
IW-famine relative to GR
Post-famine relative to IW-famine

0.053
0.095
0.403

0.056
0.097
0.413

0.056
0.099
0.413

Robust standard errors clustered at the region and marriage year level are in parentheses; ∗ ∗ ∗ p < .01, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ p < .1. All
regressions control for region ﬁxed effects, marriage year and marriage year squared, and a constant not reported in the table. Bride
and groom characteristics include their age and education, differences in their age and education, dummies for relative wealth of
the two families at the time of the marriage, and a dummy if the marriage was an arranged or chosen by the bride or groom.
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bias.51 Nonetheless, to address any such bias, we add the total number of marriages recorded in each year in the sample as
an additional control in three datasets (PKSF, BRULS and the merged data); the results (not reported) remain robust.
8. Other plausible explanations
We next examine other possible explanations of the observed patterns in mehr and dowry, particularly legal changes and
missing women. We argue that these factors do not explain the observed patterns.
8.1. Natural shocks or legal changes?
As discussed in Section 3, two legal changes in Bangladesh after 1960 aimed to restrict polygamy among Muslims as well
as to curb the practice of dowry that coincided with the natural shocks, namely the MFLO in 1961 and MMDA in 1974. Our
theoretical predictions contradict those of Ambrus et al. (2010), who theorize that the MFLO increases both dowry and mehr
(see Section III.C). They argue that the MFLO, by increasing the abandonment costs for men, caused a shift from polygamy to
monogamy, which in turn raised both mehr and dowry. Given that the link between the MFLO and a decrease in polygamy
is not clear,52 we abstract from polygamy, as well as abandonment, and instead capture any possible effect of the MFLO as
an increase in utility from marriage, ﬁnding that the MFLO causes a decline in both mehr and dowry. In contrast, both our
framework as well as Ambrus et al. (2010) suggest that the MMDA decreases both dowry and mehr. Given that both income
shocks and legal changes occurred at the same time, empirically disentangling the effect of natural shocks from the legal
changes is a daunting challenge. In the following, we do that by exploiting another natural experiment in West Bengal. In
Appendix B, we also demonstrate that the empirical results reported by Ambrus et al. (2010) are sensitive to their empirical
methodology.
8.1.1. Evidence from West Bengal: Another natural experiment
In 1947, (United) Bengal was partitioned by the British into two regions; while the eastern region became a part of
Pakistan (East Pakistan, now Bangladesh), the western region became a part of India (West Bengal). Bangladesh and West
Bengal are not only similar in many respects including climate, geography, language, and level of economic development, but
also the new agricultural technologies under the GR were introduced in Bangladesh and West Bengal almost simultaneously.
However, being parts of two countries, Bangladesh and West Bengal differ in terms of legal changes introduced after 1947.
Therefore, if the changes in the values of mehr and dowry in West Bengal mirror those in Bangladesh during the GR period,
we can conclude that these changes are driven by the GR and not by legal changes.
To examine West Bengal, we follow an approach similar to Banerjee et al. (2002), who take the agricultural sector of
Bangladesh as a valid counterfactual for that in West Bengal and ﬁnd the effect of a policy change (tenancy reform) in West
Bengal on agricultural rice yields by comparing rice yields in Bangladesh (through a difference-in-difference method). They
rely on the assumption that in the absence of the policy reform, agriculture was growing at the same rate in both countries.
Similar to Banerjee et al. (2002), we test whether agricultural growth was the same in Bangladesh and West Bengal between
1961 and 1970. We regress agricultural value added over 1961–1970 against year dummies and an indicator that tracks
whether the district is in Bangladesh.53 Similar to Banerjee et al. (2002), the hypothesis is rejected, as the coeﬃcient of the
Bangladesh is not signiﬁcantly different from zero.54
Unlike the IW or famine in Bangladesh, there is no evidence of such negative economic shocks in West Bengal, although
this region may have indirectly suffered from the IW shock in neighboring Bangladesh. About 1.5 million refugees from
Bangladesh took shelter in bordering Indian regions including West Bengal. While a few West Bengal districts also suffered
from ﬂooding in 1974 (one of the reasons for the famine in Bangladesh), there were no reports of either famine or extreme
hunger in these districts of West Bengal. Flooding is a natural event that occurs frequently in this part of West Bengal and
Bangladesh. Therefore, the events in the 1971–1975 period can at most be characterized as a period of economic hardship,
but not as shocks.
We choose the same cut-off periods for West Bengal as in Bangladesh: (i) pre-GR (pre-1961), (ii) the GR (1961–1970),
(iii) the IW (1971–1975), and (iv) post-famine (post-1975). Based on our theoretical framework, we expect mehr and dowry
to have increased in the GR period relative to the pre-GR period. In the absence of any further shocks, the values of dowry
and mehr would then have stabilized or decreased (because of economic hardship) in the post-1970 period.
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 5 present the benchmark results for mehr and dowry, respectively. The value of mehr increases
signiﬁcantly (about 130%) in 1961–1970, but there are no signiﬁcant changes in the subsequent periods compared with the
51

Dowry related death of women is not a concern in our case. In our data, all marriages are recorded as long as one of the spouses is alive.
The effectiveness of the MFLO in increasing mehr is doubtful given that (a) the government failed to provide suﬃcient funds for it’s implementation
and (b) it is unclear whether polygamy decreased after the MFLO.
53
For Bangladesh, the growth data are calculated from agricultural value added in constant LCU. The data source is the World Development Indicators
of the World Bank. For West Bengal, growth is calculated from the agricultural yield data for six districts (Cooch Behar, Malda, Murshidabad, Nadia, North
Dinajpur, and South Dinajpur) from where we collected our marriage market data. The data are sourced from various issues of the Statistical Abstract of
the West Bengal Government.
54
The coeﬃcient of the Bangladesh is -3.73 with a t-statistic of -0.59.
52
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Table 5
Impact of exogenous shocks on the real values of mehr and dowry in West Bengal.

GR coeﬃcient relative to pre-GR
IW-famine relative to GR
Post-famine relative to IW-famine
Observations
R-squared
Bride and groom characteristics
Interaction between region and year of marriage
p-value for χ 2 test for the equality of coeﬃcients
for dowry and mehr:
GR relative to pre-GR
IW-famine relative to GR
Post-famine relative to IW-famine

Log of
Mehr
(1)

Log of
Dowry
(2)

Log of
Mehr
(3)

Log of
Dowry
(4)

Log of
Mehr
(5)

Log of
Dowry
(6)

1.310∗
(0.783)
0.147
(0.352)
-0.379
(0.338)
1,158
0.200
No
No

-0.319
(2.107)
-1.178
(0.887)
-1.430∗
(0.797)
1,186
0.133
No
No

1.018
(0.795)
0.000
(0.347)
-0.431
(0.333)
1,158
0.232
Yes
No

-1.029
(2.105)
-1.428
(0.879)
-1.454∗
(0.792)
1,186
0.216
Yes
No

0.888
(0.792)
-0.017
(0.341)
-0.471
(0.328)
1,158
0.254
Yes
Yes

-1.097
(2.106)
-1.439
(0.873)
-1.470∗
(0.784)
1,186
0.218
Yes
Yes

0.437
0.119
0.185

0.329
0.100
0.205

0.340
0.100
0.219

Robust standard errors clustered at the region and marriage year level are in parentheses; ∗ ∗ ∗ p < .01, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ p < .1. All
regressions control for region ﬁxed effects, marriage year and marriage year squared, and a constant not reported in the table. Bride
and groom characteristics include their age and education, differences in their age and education, dummies for relative wealth of
the two families at the time of the marriage, and a dummy if the marriage was an arranged or chosen by the bride or groom.

previous period. Further, there are no signiﬁcant changes in the value of dowry in either 1961–1970 or 1971–1975 relative to
the previous period. However, dowry decreases in the post-1975 period relative to 1971–1975. The results for the effects of
the GR are similar to those obtained for Bangladesh while the results for IW-famine are not and thus support our argument
that natural shocks but not legal changes explain the changes in the value of mehr.
8.2. Missing women and marriage squeeze
We now examine whether the increased mehr in the 1960s was a result of missing women, a term coined by Sen (1990).
The gender ratio (i.e., the number of males per 100 females) at birth in Bangladesh is similar to that in countries where
prenatal discrimination is not observed or reported (UNFPA (2012)) (Appendix A, Table A.4).
Bangladesh, however, has a high female mortality rate (Kabeer et al. (2013)). In addition, the age-speciﬁc sex ratio and
marriage rates need to be considered while examining whether missing women and marriage squeeze were happening in
Bangladesh. Table A.4 in Appendix A shows the gender ratios at different age groups for 1951–2011 collected for various
census years. The gender ratio at birth in Bangladesh remained unchanged in the 1950s and 1960s. Further, missing women
and the abnormal rise in the proportion of male births in India (West Bengal) and other developing countries are mostly
post-1970s phenomena owing to the availability of prenatal sex determination technologies (Sen (1990); UNFPA (2012),).
However, the male-female ratio for the 15–24 age group is lower than that for the 10–14 age group. One plausible explanation of this phenomenon is the high age speciﬁc migration of men from Bangladesh, both internally and internationally.
This trend has been observed since the 1950s, however, and did not change signiﬁcantly over the sample period. Hence, the
male-female ratio of these particular age groups are unlikely to be confounded with either natural shock.55
9. Conclusion
In this study, we explain the ﬂuctuations in mehr and dowry in Bangladesh since the 1960s in terms of natural shocks.
We ﬁrst develop a model based on the institutional realities in our setting in which the role of dowry is to ensure that
the marriage market clears and the role of mehr is to ensure the eﬃciency of the marriage market. Our comparative statics
results suggest that mehr and dowry are both increasing (decreasing) in shocks that raise (lower) income.
To test the model predictions, we exploit several natural experiments. In Bangladesh, the introduction of modern agricultural technologies in the 1960s (the GR) increased agricultural productivity substantially. Subsequently, the country was
subject to several negative shocks, ﬁrst the devastating IW of 1971, followed in 1974 by a famine that primarily affected
rural households. Our empirical results show that the value of mehr increased signiﬁcantly during the GR period and decreased in the IW/famine period. However, the changes in dowry in the corresponding periods are not signiﬁcant. These
results therefore provide partial support for our model predictions.
To check the robustness of our results, more speciﬁcally to rule out legal changes as an alternative explanation, we
exploit another natural experiment from the Indian state of West Bengal (bordering Bangladesh). Given that West Bengal
55
The combined effects of IW and famine on gender ratio for the marriageable age group are trivial given that the (young) male were most affected
during the IW, while the female (and children) were most affect during the famine.
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experienced a similar GR but was not subject to any of the legal changes that occurred in Bangladesh (being part of India),
these results suggest that the effects on mehr can be traced to income rather than legal shocks.
In our analysis, we account for gradual economic changes that might conceivably affect the trend values of dowry and
mehr. For example, agricultural productivity increased gradually in the post-1980 period. This increase may be attributed
to cumulative experiences gained over time since the GR shock (e.g., the innovation of newer rice varieties and increasing
role played by NGOs in the agricultural sector). However, neither of these can be regarded as a shock. Another important
aspect of the development process in Bangladesh is that while aggregate growth in the 1960s was driven mainly by the
agricultural sector, the same in the post-1980 period was driven by the non-agricultural sector in urban areas. There were
no major economic and political shocks in Bangladesh during our study period other than those considered in this work.
Further, there were no sharp changes in the values of mehr after the last shock during the famine, which is consistent with
the partial support of our model.
To conclude, our results suggest that economic and political shocks in Bangladesh inﬂuenced marriage market payments,
more prominently mehr. As a broader point, natural shocks affect social institutions, an insight that may well be true beyond
the speciﬁc example studied herein. It will not be surprising that the recent COVID-19 pandemic will have impact on many
aspects of social institutions in the future. Statistics) (2005)
Acknowledgments:
We are grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their extremely helpful comments and suggestions. We thank, without implicating, Arnab Basu, Christopher Barrett, Fahad Khalil, Abhiroop Mukhopadhyay, Tridip Ray and Kunal Sengupta as
well as the conference participants at the IZA, 10th Australian Development Economics Workshop, 2015 ASSA meeting, 11th
ACEGD, ISI Growth and Development Conference 2015 and the seminar audiences at the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, Gottingen University, Erasmus University, Indian Statistical Institute, Jadavpur University, and IGIDR Mumbai
for their helpful comments. We thank Dyotona Dasgupta and Shilpi Mukherjee for their help in data collection. Yuan Tuo
provided excellent research assistance. All errors and omissions are the sole responsibility of the authors.
Appendix A. Additional Figures and Tables

Fig. A1. GDP of Bangladesh and its growth: 1960–2010.
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Fig. A2. Data collection regions in Bangladesh and India.

Table A1
Summary statistics (BRULS (20 04–20 05) data).

Log value of mehr
Log value of dowry
Education, bride
Education, groom
Age at marriage, bride
Age at marriage, groom
Bride’s family richer
Groom’s family richer
N (All female)

All
Marriages over
the period
(1)

Regime I
Marriages
(before 1961)
(2)

Regime II
Marriages
(1961–1970)
(3)

Regime III
Marriages
(1971–1975)
(4)

Regime IV
Marriages
(1976–2004)
(5)

10.317
(0.034)
9.674
(0.030)
3.113
(0.102)
3.754
(0.107)
15.739
(0.075)
22.636
(0.108)
0.345
(0.013)
0.296
(0.012)
1367

9.615
(0.999)
10.659
(1.086)
1.125
(0.743)
3.429
(1.478)
12.375
(1.117)
21.75
(0.861)
0.5
(0.189)
0.5
(0.189)
8

10.825
(0.295)
10.746
(0.235)
1.289
(0.389)
2.733
(0.522)
13.822
(0.364)
22.622
(0.564)
0.356
(0.072)
0.356
(0.072)
45

10.437
(0.283)
10.199
(0.202)
1.625
(0.430)
2.792
(0.517)
14.396
(0.396)
22.542
(0.706)
0.271
(0.065)
0.292
(0.066)
48

10.299
(0.033)
9.609
(0.029)
3.247
(0.107)
3.829
(0.112)
15.879
(0.076)
22.646
(0.112)
0.346
(0.013)
0.293
(0.013)
1266

Figures in parentheses are standard errors.

S. Chowdhury, D. Mallick and P. Roy Chowdhury / European Economic Review 128 (2020) 103510

Fig. A3. Location of study villages in Bangladesh (BRULS 20 04–20 05 data) and West Bengal.
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Fig. A4. Mean real value of mehr and dowry by year of marriage (BRULS 20 04–20 05 data).

Fig. A5. Mean real value of mehr and dowry by year of marriage (West Bengal 2014–2015 data).

Table A2
Summary statistics (West Bengal (2014–2015) data).

Log value of mehr
Log value of dowry
Education, bride
Education, groom
Age at marriage, bride
Age at marriage, groom
Bride’s family richer
Groom’s family richer
N (All female)

All
Marriages over
the period
(1)

Regime I
Marriages
(before 1961)
(2)

Regime II
Marriages
(1961–1970)
(3)

Regime III
Marriages
(1971–1975)
(4)

Regime IV
Marriages
(1976–2014)
(5)

9.101
(0.052)
7.499
(0.106)
3.644
(0.118)
3.677
(0.121)
16.502
(0.097)
23.184
(0.141)
0.359
(0.014)
0.37
(0.014)
1242

7.52
(0.806)
3.377
(2.071)
0.158
(0.158)
0.316
(0.230)
12.737
(0.704)
23.421
(1.283)
0.421
(0.116)
0.263
(0.104)
19

8.875
(0.158)
5.143
(0.573)
0.655
(0.287)
1.891
(0.401)
13.764
(0.324)
21.818
(0.497)
0.309
(0.063)
0.327
(0.064)
55

9.241
(0.242)
5.695
(0.596)
1.435
(0.315)
2.978
(0.584)
15.087
(0.557)
21.435
(0.514)
0.37
(0.072)
0.326
(0.070)
46

9.111
(0.055)
7.713
(0.107)
3.94
(0.126)
3.85
(0.129)
16.758
(0.099)
23.318
(0.150)
0.36
(0.014)
0.376
(0.014)
1122

Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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Table A3
Robustness of the results if the data are restricted to 1989 (PKSF 2010 data).

GR coeﬃcient relative to pre-GR
IW/famine relative to GR
Post-famine relative to IW/famine
Observations
R-squared
Bride and groom characteristics

Log of
Mehr
(1)

Log of
Dowry
(2)

Log of
Mehr
(3)

Log of
Dowry
(4)

1.265∗ ∗ ∗
(0.430)
-0.415
(0.307)
-0.265
(0.360)
1,023
0.083
No

0.220
(0.379)
0.096
(0.216)
-0.238
(0.204)
1,023
0.200
No

1.180∗ ∗ ∗
(0.424)
-0.450
(0.307)
-0.208
(0.335)
1,023
0.134
Yes

0.256
(0.374)
0.088
(0.215)
-0.223
(0.196)
1,023
0.240
Yes

p-value for χ 2 test for the equality of
coeﬃcients for dowry and mehr:
GR relative to pre-GR
IW-famine relative to GR
Post-famine relative to IW-famine

0.060
0.087
0.931

0.109
0.077
0.962

Robust standard errors clustered at the region and marriage year level are in parentheses; ∗ ∗ ∗ p < .01, ∗ ∗
p < .05, ∗ p < .1. All regressions control for region ﬁxed effects, marriage year and marriage year squared,
and a constant not reported in the table. Bride and groom characteristics include their age and education,
differences in their age and education, dummies for relative wealth of the two families at the time of the
marriage, and a dummy if the marriage was an arranged or chosen by the bride or groom.
Table A4
Gender ratio (male divided by female) by age group, 1951–2011.
Age Group

1951

1961

1974

1981

1991

2011

0–4
5–9
10–14
15–24
25–34
35–44
45–59
60+

0.990
1.038
1.263
0.973
1.060
1.207
1.306
1.227

0.978
1.045
1.281
0.943
1.043
1.188
1.263
1.229

0.993
1.012
1.189
1.059
0.969
1.148
1.238
1.299

1.014
1.030
1.148
0.976
1.015
1.110
1.209
1.277

1.029
1.070
1.145
0.947
0.975
1.178
1.160
1.200

1.029
1.053
1.073
0.981
0.892
1.016
1.145
1.135

Appendix B. Replication of Ambrus et al. (2010) using the BRULS data
In the following, we compare and contrast the present study with that by Ambrus et al. (2010), who also analyze a
framework with deferred mehr, attributing the changes in dowry and mehr to the legal shocks discussed in Section 2.2. In
contrast to Ambrus et al. (2010) we examine legal changes, as well as economic and political ones. Further, we ﬁnd support
for the economic and political channels, using additional survey data from West Bengal to rule out the effect of legal shocks.
We ﬁrst compare our theoretical framework with theirs, before turning to some important differences in the estimations
and results. Apart from the difference in focus, the theoretical framework developed in the present study also generates
results that differ from those in Ambrus et al. (2010). In particular, our analysis suggests that the legal shock in the 1960s
(i.e., the MFLO) would cause a decline in mehr and dowry rather than an increase, as in Ambrus et al. (2010). As far as the
effect of the MMDA is concerned, the theoretical predictions in the two studies do coincide in that both suggest that mehr
and dowry would be adversely affected, at least in the short run. We next discuss why the comparative statics predictions
in the two frameworks differ.
As discussed in the introduction, as well as footnote (52) earlier, the argument in Ambrus et al. (20 0 0) relies on several
institutional assumptions, in particular that (i) the MFLO caused an increase in the social cost of abandonment for men,
and that (ii) there was a shift from polygamy to monogamy. None of these institutional assumptions appear to be realistic.
Additionally, in our framework, an income shock has a smaller effect on dowry relative to that on mehr, while dowry and
mehr co-move in Ambrus et al. (2015). Further, unlike Ambrus et al. (2010), we do not assume that mehr is non-negative;
this is something that emerges naturally in our framework. Ambrus et al. (2010) provide an institutional justiﬁcation for this
assumption, pointing out that negative mehr is forbidden in the Qur’an, so that religious courts do not enforce contracts with
negative mehr.
Before replicating the estimation by Ambrus et al. (2010), it is imperative to note that these authors used the BRULS
dataset but employed a different and extensive cleaning procedure to construct their working data. This involves changing
the values of dowry and mehr recorded in the survey; their cleaning code in STATA has become available to us through the
Quarterly Journal of Economics (QJE). We also received an acknowledgment from these authors through the QJE that a small
perturbation in the cleaning procedure leads to changes in their main results. Our (BRULS) data construction and working
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Table B1
Impact of legal changes on the real values of mehr and dowry (BRULS data cleaned by Ambrus et al. (2010)).

Married post-1963
Married post-1974
Married post-1990
Married post-1998
Year of marriage

(1)
Value of Mehr

(2)
Value of Dowry

(3)
Value of Mehr

(4)
Value of Dowry

(5)
Value of Mehr

(6)
Value of Dowry

114,849.754∗ ∗ ∗
(3.824)
-85,571.043∗ ∗ ∗
(-3.932)
12,418.632∗
(1.662)
42,639.01
(1.218)
-3,194.735∗ ∗
(-2.077)

18,213.205∗ ∗
(2.037)
-14,834.380∗
(-1.853)
5,782.05
(1.373)
13,874.05
(1.46)
453.963
(0.632)

34,515.82
(1.051)
-63,312.803∗ ∗ ∗
(-3.340)
12,955.63
(1.575)
33,743.861∗
(1.665)
-1,491.513∗
(-1.961)

18,732.050∗ ∗
(2.421)
-7,301.05
(-1.301)
5,772.283∗
(1.913)
17,998.046∗ ∗ ∗
(3.117)
-217.231
(-0.919)

Yes
No
1,367
0.099

Yes
No
1,367
0.034

No
No
1,367
0.087

No
No
1,367
0.031

33,751.36
(1.037)
-61,322.529∗ ∗ ∗
(-3.264)
13,626.43
(1.626)
29,165.96
(1.53)
-1,932.312∗ ∗
(-2.361)
3,966.032∗ ∗
(2.525)
-3.337
(-0.005)
5,214.61
(0.782)
No
Yes
1,367
0.095

18,618.318∗ ∗
(2.39)
-6,977.55
(-1.239)
5,885.806∗
(1.941)
17,364.569∗ ∗ ∗
(3.068)
-283.507
(-1.187)
586.026
(1.53)
18.174
(0.061)
1,431.62
(0.588)
No
Yes
1,367
0.033

Age at the time of the ﬁrst marriage
Age difference between spouses
Bride’s family wealthier than groom’s
Eight-year dummies
Bride and groom’s characteristics
Observations
R-squared

Figures in parentheses are robust t-values clustered at the household level. ∗ ∗ ∗ p < .01, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ p < .1. Columns 1 and 2 use the exact speciﬁcation of
Ambrus et al. and their data. In columns 3 to 6, the seven eight-year dummies are dropped. In columns 5 and 6, we add the three characteristics (age at
the time of the ﬁrst marriage, age difference between spouses, bride’s family wealthier than groom’s) found in Ambrus et al.’s data and used as dependent
variables in their analysis (Ambrus et al. (2010) Table III, columns 4 to 6).

sample selection, discussed in Section 5, do not involve any such cleaning as the imputation of missing values or changing
the recorded values.
Ambrus et al. (2010) estimate the same equations as (28) and (29) with the exceptions that the values of dowry and
mehr are not expressed in logarithm and the attributes of brides and grooms are excluded. Their identifying assumption is
that the legal changes in 1961 and 1974 did not coincide with any other changes that may have inﬂuenced dowry and mehr.
More importantly, they divide the entire period into seven equal (eight-year) sub-periods and include these sub-period
dummies as additional controls in their regressions. We show below that their results crucially depend on the inclusion of
these ad hoc dummies. As stated in their paper, these dummies are included to account for non-linearity in the trends of
dowry and mehr. However, the movements in the values of dowry and mehr in Fig. A.4 do not suggest cyclical patterns
repeating every eight years as in the business cycle literature. Moreover, the pattern of business cycle ﬂuctuations of GDP
in Bangladesh (Appendix A, Figs. A.1) is different from that in developed countries, especially in the United States (see
Baxter and King (1999)for business cycle patterns in the United States). Therefore, the inclusion of these dummies cannot
be justiﬁed on the grounds of controlling for ﬂuctuations in aggregate economic activity in Bangladesh. These dummies
rather confound the interpretation of the dummies of legal changes. The coeﬃcients of these sub-period dummies provide
estimates of the average value of dowry or mehr in each sub-period relative to the base category. Similarly, the dummies
for legal changes also provide estimates of the average value of dowry or mehr in the respective periods (relative to the
base category). Given that these two sets of dummies substantially overlap, what the dummies for legal changes capture is
unclear.
We ﬁrst replicate Ambrus et al. (2010) benchmark results (see Table II on p. 1384 in their paper) using their cleaned data
(http://sites.duke.edu/ericaﬁeld/data/ (accessed March 19, 2014)). Despite minor differences in magnitudes, we can replicate
their benchmark results in Table B.1 (columns 1 and 2). The two legal changes, the MFLO and the MMDA, are represented
by post-1963 and post-1974, respectively. Post-1990 and post-1998 represent two other legal changes. As found by Ambrus
et al. (2010), the ﬁrst two legal changes had a statistically signiﬁcant impact on both mehr and dowry.
We now verify whether the above results are due to the inclusion of the ad hoc eight-year sub-period dummies. Columns
3 and 4 respectively present the results for mehr and dowry excluding these dummies. For the value of mehr, the magnitude of the coeﬃcient of the MFLO (the ﬁrst legal change) is not statistically signiﬁcant and much smaller. Similarly, for
the value of dowry, the magnitude of the coeﬃcient of the MMDA (the second legal change) is also not statistically significant and again much smaller. Thus, their main results do not hold. The results after controlling for the bride and groom
characteristics, reported in columns 5 and 6, are similar to those in columns 3 and 4.
We now estimate the benchmark speciﬁcation of Ambrus et al. (2010) using our data, and we use the merged (BRULS and
PKSF) datasets to take advantage of a larger and more representative sample. To be consistent with Ambrus et al. (2010), we
retain marriages from the PKSF dataset only until 2004. Table B2 presents the results. Columns 1 and 2 exactly replicate the
speciﬁcation in Table II in Ambrus et al. (2010) including the sub-period dummies. Columns 3 and 4 exclude the sub-period
dummies for the reasons discussed earlier. In both cases, we ﬁnd no impact of any legal changes on the values of mehr or
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Table B2
Impact of legal changes on the real values of mehr and dowry (PKSF and BRULS merged data) alternative speciﬁcation.

Post-1963
Post-1974
Post-1990
Post-1998
Observations
R-squared
Eight-year dummies

Value of Mehr
(1)

Value of Dowry
(2)

Value of Mehr
(3)

Value of Dowry
(4)

-11,834.074
(47,184.544)
-58,680.678
(57,298.499)
-47,682.420
(57,124.396)
-29,380.522
(58,094.028)
2,996
0.077
Yes

-18,108.566
(20,633.244)
-30,113.342
(22,991.317)
-25,948.558
(24,354.543)
-12,113.438
(25,312.391)
2,996
0.069
Yes

48,618.348
(30,036.072)
8,399.336
(32,263.341)
8,880.165
(35,869.189)
31,342.721
(40,397.891)
2,996
0.071
No

16,723.283
(19,503.022)
-24,034.828
(17,278.404)
-18,563.292
(18,509.604)
-1,912.990
(20,098.421)
2,996
0.065
No

Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are in parentheses; ∗ ∗ ∗ p < .01, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗
p < .1. All regressions control for the dummies for relationship with the household head, marriage
year, dummies for regions, seven eight-year period dummies, and a constant. Columns 3 and 4 do
not include the seven eight-year period dummies.
Table B3
Impact of exogenous shocks on the real values of mehr and dowry (BRULS
data cleaned by Ambrus et al. (2010)).

GR coeﬃcient relative to pre-GR
IW-famine relative to GR
Post-famine relative to IW-famine
Observations
R-squared
p-value for χ 2 test for the equality
of coeﬃcients for dowry and mehr:
GR relative to pre-GR
IW-famine relative to GR
Post-famine relative to IW-famine

Log of Mehr
(1)

Log of Dowry
(2)

0.274
(0.540)
0.001
(0.337)
-0.298
(0.306)
1,367
0.095

1.563∗ ∗
(0.759)
-0.330
(0.329)
-0.383
(0.335)
915
0.102

0.133
0.438
0.819

Robust standard errors clustered at the region and marriage year levels
are in parentheses; ∗ ∗ ∗ p < .01, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ p < .1.

dowry. To summarize, the results in Ambrus et al. (2010) are not robust to an alternative data-cleaning procedure, modest
changes in speciﬁcation, or using alternative data.
The difference in the data-cleaning procedure is a non-trivial issue and requires further attention. We therefore investigate whether our explanation of the role of natural shocks holds in the BRULS data cleaned by Ambrus et al. (2010).
Table B.3 presents the results. It is important to reiterate that Ambrus et al. (2010) replace many recorded (and missing)
values by 0s in the cleaning procedure; therefore, logarithmic transformation reduces the effective sample size by about
30% in the dowry equation, which is a non-trivial change in the data. Nonetheless, the results again partially support our
model predictions; however, this time the results are signiﬁcant in the case of dowry, unlike in the case of mehr reported
in Tables 2, 3, and 4.
Appendix C. Additional Material on the Theoretical Framework
We present a series of additional results that extend the parsimonious model examined in Sections (3) and (4) in various
directions.
 The marriage shock t varies continuously: Next, letting t denote the productivity of a marriage, we analyze the situation
in which t is distributed continuously over [t , t ] with distribution G(t), where t < 1 < t . Thus, t = t denotes a successful
marriage, whereas a failed marriage has t = t . Let the parameter values be such that

t m < mμm < t m,

(C.1)

and, t(w + m ) < wμw + mμm < t(w + m ).

(C.2)
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Equation (C.1) implies that there exists t∗∗ , where t < t ∗∗ = μm < t , such that in the absence of any mehr, divorce happens
w + mμ m
when t < t∗∗ , but not otherwise. By contrast, (C.2) ensures that there exists t ∗ = wμw
, where t < t ∗ < t , so that divorce
+m
is eﬃcient whenever t ≤ t∗ , but not otherwise. Further, note that t∗ < t∗∗ . This implies that with 0 mehr, if t ≤ t∗ or if
t > t∗∗ , divorce happens if and only if it is also eﬃcient. On the contrary, whenever t∗ < t < t∗∗ , men opt to divorce their
spouses even though doing so is ineﬃcient, creating a role for mehr. Thus, mehr is set at the minimum level that resolves
this potential ineﬃciency.
Deﬁne M (t ) = m[μm − t], so that M(t) is decreasing in t. Setting mehr at the level M∗ = M (t ∗ ) prevents ineﬃcient divorce
in the case of t ≥ t∗ . Further, given that M(t) is decreasing in t, in the case of t ≤ t∗ , divorce will happen and consequently
mehr payments will be made in the equilibrium. Given that mehr is paid, the payoff of a man that divorces his wife is
mμm − M (t ∗ ) = t ∗ m. Finally, there will be no divorce in the case of t ≥ t∗ (since M(t∗ ) ≥ M(t)).
t
We then solve for the equilibrium dowry D∗ . Deﬁne t˜ = t ∗ G(t ∗ ) + t ∗ t dG(t ), where t˜ > t ∗ . Then, mimicking our earlier
argument, we can show that (D∗ , M∗ ), where

D∗ = m[μm − t˜],
and, M∗ = m[μm − t ∗ ],
can be sustained as an equilibrium. As in the baseline framework, in this equilibrium, men are indifferent between entering
the marriage market and remaining single, and there is no ineﬃcient divorce.
Next, turning to the effect of income shocks,

dD∗
=
dm
∗
dM
and,
=
dm

dt˜
dt ∗
= μm − t˜ − mG(t ∗ )
,
dm
dm
∗
dt
μm − t ∗ − m .
dm

μm − t˜ − m

It is straightforward to check that
G(t ∗ ))

dt ∗

dM∗
dm

> 0 whenever m > 1. We then note that

dD∗
dm

dM∗
dm
(i.e., t∗

<

whenever t˜ − t ∗ − m(1 −

> 0. This holds whenever divorce is eﬃcient in only a small proportion of cases
is close to t).56
dm
 Dowry is determined through Nash bargaining: Thus far, dowry has been interpreted as a groom price that clears the
marriage market. We now examine a related framework in which dowry is instead determined through Nash bargaining.
Such a framework may not be too farfetched given that marriages in these societies often involve negotiations between two
families. However, as in the baseline framework, mehr is taken to be a conditional payment that serves to prevent ineﬃcient
divorce. The framework is the same as before, except that we assume that the economy consists of exactly one man and
one woman to abstract from issues related to matching. Doing so also abstracts from any competitive forces operating here.
Further, for ease of exposition, we assume two types of marriages, successful and average, with the marriage being
successful with the probability γ s and average with the probability 1 − γs . The marriage parameter is S for a successful
marriage and t for a failure. We assume that if the marriage is average, then it is eﬃcient that divorce does not happen;
however, in the absence of mehr, men have an incentive to get divorced, namely

mμm + wμw < t (m + w ),

μm > t.

We argue that there is a close and intuitive connection between the dowry in this case and that in the baseline framework.
For ease of exposition, we also assume that men do not have any property rights over their wife’s income.
The timeline is as follows:
• Stage 1: The man and woman bargain over the surplus. If they reach an agreement, then the marriage takes place and
the agreement is codiﬁed in a contract (D, M), with the amount D being paid upfront.
• Stage 2: Following a marriage, the man and woman realize if the marriage is a success or failure, and the man decides
whether to get divorced. In the case of divorce, the man pays the woman the agreed upon mehr M.
In this framework, an equilibrium is a vector (D∗ , M∗ ) and a divorce rule such that:
1. The man takes the divorce decision in his own interest given the contract (D∗ , M∗ ) and state of the marriage.
2. M∗ is the minimum level of mehr such that ineﬃcient divorce is prevented.
3. The dowry D∗ is set through Nash bargaining between the man and woman.
We next turn to solving for the equilibrium mehr and dowry. One can mimic the argument in the main text to argue
that Proposition 1 holds in this case as well. Further, given μm > t, mehr is positive.
Turning to dowry, we then solve for the Nash bargaining game between the man and woman, where the bargaining
power of the man is β and that of the woman is 1 − β , 0 < β < 1.
Straightforward analysis (see Chowdhury et al. (2019)) shows that the dowry is

D∗ = m(μm − γs S − (1 − γs )t] + β [(γs S + (1 − γs )t )(m + w ) − mμm − wμw ],
56

∗

]=
This follows since limt ∗ →t [t˜ − t ∗ − m(1 − G(t ∗ )) dt
dm

t
t

t G(t ) − t > 0.

(C.3)
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where recall that m[μm − γs S − (1 − γs )t] equals the dowry in our baseline framework whenever t = ta and γ f = 0. Thus, we
get back the competitive dowry in the limit as the bargaining power of the groom’s family vanishes (i.e., β goes to zero).
All the comparative statics results go through as long as β is not too large. Whether β is large or small is an empirical
question and depends on multiple factors. On the one hand, the fact that societal norms are biased in favor of men suggests
that β will not be too small; on the other hand, the competitive forces arising from the fact that men are more numerous
than women suggest that β cannot be too large.57 A more realistic model may have elements of both marriage market
competition and inter-family bargaining. That must await future work though.
 Risk-averse agents: Let the utility function of men be um (.) and that of women be uw (.), where both um (.) and uw (.)
are concave. It is straightforward to check that the equilibrium mehr remains unchanged at M∗ = m(μm − ta ), while the
equilibrium dowry D∗ solves

um (μm m ) = γ u(Sm + D∗ ) + (1 − γs )u(ta m + D∗ ).

(C.4)
xα

Let the utility functions of men satisfy CRRA, so that um (x ) = α , where 0 < α < 1. One can then show that
Chowdhury et al. (2019) for the details). Thus, both mehr and dowry are increasing in m. Moreover,

dD∗
dM∗
| α → 1 = μm − t a − γ ( S − t a ) < μm − t a =
.
dm
dm

dD∗
dm

> 0 (see

(C.5)

Thus, whenever agents are not too risk averse (i.e., α is not too small), Propositions 3 and 4 go through.
 Non-cooperative formulation: Consider a two-stage game in which, in stage 1, all men simultaneously make anonymous
marriage offers, with the i-th man making an offer of (Di , Mi ). Then, in stage 2, the women sequentially decide which of
the remaining offers to accept, if at all. We look for the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game, arguing that the
outcome where all men make an offer of (D∗ , M∗ ) in stage 1 can be sustained as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Clearly, in stage 2, any woman considers the set of offers still on the table, accepting the one that yields her the highest
utility (breaking ties randomly), as long as there is one offer that yields her at least μw w. Otherwise, she rejects all offers.
We then argue that given that every man offers (D∗ , M∗ ), no man has an incentive to deviate from (D∗ , M∗ ). (D∗ , M∗ )
maximizes the aggregate expected surplus from any marriage since a mehr of M∗ ensures that divorce happens if and only
if it is eﬃcient. Consequently, under any deviant offer (D , M ), the aggregate surplus cannot be any higher, whereas for this
offer to be acceptable to women, they must be offered at least as much utility as they obtain under (D∗ , M∗ ). Hence, the
utility of the concerned man cannot be any higher than what he would obtain under (D∗ , M∗ ).
Supplementary material
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.
103510
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